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I Introduction
1
Introduction
Household debt increased substantially over the last decades. In the US economy, it
rose from 96% of disposable personal income in 2000 to 128% in 2008. In some southern
European countries the increase in household indebtedness was even more pronounced.
In Spain, it almost doubled, from 69% in 2000 to 130% in 2008.1
Given this significant increase in household indebtedness, recent contributions have
pointed to the important role of private debt for the propagation and amplification of
economic shocks and policy interventions. For example, Mian and Sufi (2011, 2012)
empirically show that those US counties which experienced the largest increase in
housing leverage before the financial crises, suffered from more pronounced economic
slack in the postcrisis periods. They detect private debt overhang as the major reason
for the slow economic recovery after the financial crisis. Within a heterogeneous agents
model, Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) show that an increase in household
indebtedness, induced by a significant rise in income inequality, makes the outburst of
a financial crises more likely. Other theoretical contributions have shown the impact
of fiscal policy to be larger when private indebtedness is high (Andrés, Boscá, and
Ferri, 2015; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Kaplan and Violante, 2014). My thesis
contributes to the still growing literature on the relation between household debt and
economic activity as it tries to answer the following four questions:
1. Is there an empirical long-run relationship between income inequality and private
indebtedness?
2. Is interpersonal comparison a significant determinant of short-run credit move-
ments?
3. Do the effects of fiscal policy interventions depend on the level of private indebt-
edness?
1The specific values are taken from McKinsey (2010).
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4. How does private household debt evolves in response to fiscal and non-fiscal
shocks?
Each of the four Chapters of my thesis focuses on one of these research questions
separately. Chapters 1 and 2 study relevant determinants of households’ borrowing
decisions. In Chapter 1, I show that income inequality and household debt are cointe-
grated of order one. Thus, rising income inequality leads to a higher level of household
indebtedness in the long-run. Chapter 2 provides macro-evidence for the relevance
of consumption externalities between different income groups for explaining short-run
credit dynamics. I estimate a business cycle model with consumer credit in which
poorer households are characterized by a relative consumption motive. The keeping-
up parameter is estimated to be positive and significantly different from zero indicating
the important role of interpersonal comparison in understanding credit movements over
the business cycle. Chapter 3 empirically studies non-linearities emerging from private
debt overhang. More specifically, I show that the economic effects to fiscal consolida-
tions crucially depend on the level of private indebtedness. When private debt is low,
austerity has no significant impact on main macro aggregates. However, when private
debt is high, fiscal consolidations lead to a significant and severe reduction in eco-
nomic activity. In Chapter 4, I study the response of household debt to two important
economic shocks: technology improvements and tax cuts. Thereby, I empirically show
how household debt changes in response to both shocks, and then propose a theoretical
model with financial frictions that is able to replicate the empirical responses.
The recent financial crises has been attributed to a considerable increase in income
inequality by several authors (Morelli and Atkinson, 2015; Rajan, 2010). Kumhof,
Rancière, and Winant (2015) study the interrelation between rising income disparity,
private indebtedness, and the outburst of a financial crisis. Moreover, Iacoviello (2008)
shows that the significant increase in household debt in the US economy over the last
decades is closely linked to the rising income inequality observable over the same time
period. Despite this growing interest and theoretical debate about the inequality-
leverage nexus, the empirical research in this area is still scanty. Chapter 1 contributes
3
to this literature as it tests for the empirical validation of the long-run inequality-
household debt relationship. Based on a panel of OECD countries, I show that income
inequality and household debt are cointegrated of order one. Thus, my findings imply
that rising income inequality is associated with an increase in household debt in the
long-run.
Whereas Chapter 1 studies the long-run evolution of household debt, in Chapter 2, I
take a closer look at the business cycle dynamics of consumer credit in the US economy.
Motivated by business cycle statistics that refutes the standard consumption smooth-
ing role of credit2, I propose a business cycle model in which credit is additionally used
as a source of reducing consumption disparities between different income groups. This
mechanism is modeled as a consumption externality in the utility function of poorer
household groups. Recent empirical studies have shown that interpersonal compari-
son is a significant determinant in individuals’ consumption decisions (Bertrand and
Morse, 2013; Carr and Jayadev, 2015; Drechsel-Grau and Schmid, 2014). I estimate
deep-model parameters by matching the theoretical business cycle statistics to the
empirical ones. The relative consumption parameter is estimated to be positive and
significantly different from zero. This finding implies that interpersonal comparison is
an important determinant of short-run credit movements. Complementary to recent
microeconometric studies, this chapter provides macro-evidence on the linkage between
consumption externalities and individuals’ borrowing decisions.
Chapter 3 studies how private indebtedness amplifies the effects to fiscal policy inter-
ventions. Specifically, I provide empirical evidence that the consequences to fiscal con-
solidations crucially depend on the level of private debt overhang. Austerity measures
implemented when private debt is low are hardly followed by any significant change
in economic activity. In contrast, when private debt is high, fiscal consolidations lead
to severe and significant reductions in private consumption and GDP. I find similar
private debt-dependent effects of fiscal consolidations for other components of GDP,
employment, government debt, and the default probability of the government. Two
2I show that credit is positively correlated with aggregate output and personal consumption ex-
penditures.
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central goals of fiscal consolidations are the reduction of public debt burdens and/or
reducing the governments’ default probability. Indeed, my results imply that consolida-
tions implemented when private debt is high lead to a worsening of public finances and
increase the probability of default. Notably, my findings are robust when controlling
for two other prominent state variables: the state of the business cycle and the govern-
ment debt level. Therefore, the state of the business cycle and the government debt
level seem to be of minor importance for the effects of fiscal consolidations once one
controls for the level of private indebtedness in the economy. I highlight two additional
results detecting changes in household balance sheets as a possible transmission chan-
nel through which my findings can be rationalized. First, by differentiating between
household and corporate debt, I show that most of the results are driven by household
leverage. Therefore, private debt-dependent effects of fiscal policy seem to be caused
by households’ not firms’ borrowing decisions. Second, house prices significantly de-
cline when fiscal consolidations are implemented in high private debt states, whereas
they basically do not show any effect in low private debt states. Falling house prices
typically reduce the value of home equity households can use as collateral to borrow
against. Chapter 3 contributes to the literature as it tests for the validity of existing
theoretical models which show that private indebtedness matters for the transmission
of fiscal policy (for example Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri, 2015; Eggertsson and Krugman,
2012; Kaplan and Violante, 2014). In fact, I provide extensive empirical evidence that
confirms predictions of theories pointing out the impact of fiscal policy interventions to
be larger in periods of private debt overhang. Moreover, my results help understanding
the dismal growth performances in southern European countries, which implemented
large-scale fiscal consolidation programs while confronted with high private debt levels.
In Chapter 4, I study how household debt reacts to two exogenous innovations,
namely TFP shocks and tax cuts. In the empirical part of the Chapter, it is shown
that both shocks induce a significant and persistent increase in household debt. Out-
put, durable, and non-durable consumption also increase in a humped-shaped manner
implying a strong comovment between household debt and aggregate economic activity.
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In the second part of the Chapter, I propose a theoretical model that is able to account
for the empirical responses. The model is populated by two types of household who
differ in their willingness to postpone consumption into the future, creating lenders and
borrowers. In contrast to the lender, the borrowing capacity of indebted households is
limited to a fraction of their non-depreciated stock of durables. To match theoretical
impulse responses with the empirical data, deep model parameters are estimated by the
simulated method of moments approach. The results suggest that the model can suc-
cessfully account for the sizes and the hump-shaped patterns of the empirical dynamics
in all variables. In line with the empirical findings, the model produces persistent in-
creases in household debt, which last for more than 20 quarters. Moreover, the debt
responses almost perfectly match the empirical counterparts. The point estimates of
deep model parameters are in line with findings of previous studies (see for example,
Iacoviello, 2005; Mertens and Ravn, 2012). The Chapter contributes to the literature
as it, first, presents empirical evidence on the conditional procyclicality of household
debt, and second, shows that a representative agent model with incomplete financial
markets as proposed by Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2009) can successfully account
for these empirical responses.
6
II Chapters
7
1 Inequality and Household Debt: a Panel
Cointegration Analysis1
Abstract
This study investigates whether there exists an empirical long-run relationship between
income inequality and household debt. By using panel cointegration techniques, I find
that inequality and private leverage are cointegrated of order one and therefore share
a common trending relation. Removing this trend by first differencing the series leads
to biased inference. My results are robust to different indicators for household debt
and alternative inequality measures. In the long-run, a one-percentage point increase
in inequality is associated with an increase in household debt by 2% to 6%, depending
on the inequality measure used.
Keywords: Income Inequality, Household Debt, Panel Cointegration.
JEL Codes: C23, D31, E25.
1.1 Introduction
Several authors have attributed the recent financial crisis of 2008/09 to a considerable
rise in income inequality (e.g. Morelli and Atkinson, 2015; Rajan, 2010). Rajan (2010)
argues that rising inequality in the United States pressured different governments to
enact redistribution policies aimed at improving the lot of those low- and middle-
income voters being left behind. The author also points out that in combination with
a relaxation of underwriting standards, rising income disparity led to an increasing use
of credit unsupported by greater income. The resulting credit bubble is seen as one of
the foundations for the subsequent crisis (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). Following this
argumentation, Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) study the relationship between
1A shortened version of this chapter is published as Klein (2015).
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income inequality, household debt and, the likelihood of a financial crisis within a DSGE
framework. Additionally, Iacoviello (2008) develops a heterogenous agents model which
is able to capture the trend and cyclical behavior of debt and income dispersion for
the US economy.
Despite this growing interest and theoretical debate about the inequality-leverage-
crisis nexus, the empirical research in this area is still scanty. One exception is the
study by Bordo and Meissner (2012). They explicitly test the empirical support for
the hypothesis set up by Rajan (2010) and Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015)
within a panel dataset covering 14 advanced economies. By estimating the effect of
changes in income inequality on the change of bank loans, the authors do not find
a significant relationship between inequality and bank loans growth. The results of
Bordo and Meissner (2012) coincide with those of Morelli and Atkinson (2015) who fail
to find a causal relation between changes in income inequality and economic crises.
My study differs from those by Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Morelli and Atkinson
(2015) in three important dimensions. First, a more precise measure of household debt
offered by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is used. The BIS debt vari-
able measures the outstanding amount of credit to private households and therefore
does not include credit to the business sector as the series used in Bordo and Meissner
(2012) does. Second, in order to check for the sensitivity of the results, I consider
four different inequality indicators. Three of these series, namely the top 1% income
share, the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient, and the Gini index measure the income
distribution within one economy. The fourth one, the labor income share, includes
information about the distribution of factor incomes. Most importantly, this study
differs from Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Morelli and Atkinson (2015) in the under-
lying hypothesis tested. While Bordo and Meissner (2012) and Morelli and Atkinson
(2015) investigate the relationship between changes in income inequality and private
debt, I test for the relationship between inequality and debt in levels.
By using panel cointegration methods, I test whether the levels of income inequality
and household debt share a common long-run relationship. Based on all these consid-
9
erations, my study can be seen as a more precise and general approach for testing for
the existence of a long-run relationship between income inequality and household debt
as hypothesized in Rajan (2010) and theoretically modeled in Kumhof, Rancière, and
Winant (2015) and Iacoviello (2008).
My results suggest that there exits a long-run relationship between income disparity
and household debt. This result is robust to all four inequality measures considered.
Moreover, a common trending relation is present whether the underlying cointegration
test allows for cross-sectional dependence or not. Depending on the inequality indicator
used, in the long-run, a one-percentage point increase in inequality leads to an increase
in household debt by 2% to 6%.
The remaining chapters of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 will review
the existing literature on the connection between inequality, credit, and financial crises.
Section 3 describes the panel cointegration tests used in the study. Section 4 presents
the data and addresses the problem of unit root tests on bounded variables because
some of the inequality measures considered in this paper have a limited value range.
Cointegration test results are reported in Section 5. Estimations of the long-run rela-
tionship between inequality and household debt are presented in Section 6 and section
7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Rajan (2010) proposes a linkage between inequality, credit expansion, and financial
crisis in the United States in the first decade of the 21st century. Rajan argues that
rising inequality led to political pressure for redistribution in the form of subsidized
housing finance via institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The resulting lending
boom created an unsustainable increase in house prices which reversed in 2007 and
finally can be identified as one major reason for the crisis of 2008/09. Along these
lines, Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) model a relationship between inequality,
household debt, and the probability of a crisis within a DSGE framework. Their model
consists of two representative agents: an investor, who owns all of the capital, earns
10
only capital income, and saves and invests as well as consumes; and a worker who earns
wage income, demands loans offered by the investor, and uses these income sources for
consumption. A negative shock on the bargaining power of workers leads to an increase
in income differences between the two agents. Due to a subsistence level of consumption
included in the worker’s utility function, the pronounced rise in inequality results in
an increasing amount of loans demanded by workers, in order to maintain the desired
level of consumption. Consequently, workers’ household debt rises as well. Because
the authors assume a convex relation between household debt and the probability of
an economic crisis, they connect rising inequality to an increasing amount of leverage
and, ultimately to a higher probability of a crisis. Rancière et al. (2012) extend this
model to an open economy framework.
By using a heterogenous agents model, Iacoviello (2008) is able to replicate the long-
run and short-run dynamics of household debt and income inequality in the United
States. Based on the theoretical model set up by Krusell and Smith (1998), agents face
aggregate and idiosyncratic income shocks and accumulate real and financial assets.
In the model there are so-called patient agents which have a low discount rate and do
not face borrowing constraints and impatient agents which discount the future more
heavily and face a collateral constraint. In response to a negative idiosyncratic income
shock, unconstrained agents reduce consumption by a small amount but increase their
debt. Instead, constrained agents behave like hand-to-mouth consumers by reducing
consumption and borrowing less. The simulated model successfully captures the ob-
served income inequality and household debt series. Additionally, the model attributes
the trend increase in debt to the pronounced rise in inequality, whereas business cycle
fluctuations can account for the short-run changes in household debt.
Although models like those by Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) or Iacoviello
(2008) explicitly make use of a connection between inequality and household debt, there
is only a small literature testing for this relationship empirically. Morelli and Atkinson
(2015) study the question whether economic crises were preceded by rising inequality.
By using a dataset that covers 25 countries over the period from 1911 to 2010, they
11
do not find any relationship between changes in income inequality and banking crises.
Nevertheless, they conclude that "[...] we have not investigated whether [the, note
of the author] inequality level was relatively higher before identified macroeconomic
shocks. Therefore, the level hypothesis cannot be ruled out at this stage." (Morelli and
Atkinson, 2015, p. 49). Following this considerations, Bellettini and Delbono (2013)
show that between 1982 and 2008, a large majority of banking crises have been preceded
by persistently high levels of income inequality. However, Morelli and Atkinson (2015)
and Bellettini and Delbono (2013) focus on the relationship between income inequality
and the occurence of a banking crisis and not on the connection between inequality
and household debt which is essential in the models of Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant
(2015) and Iacoviello (2008).
Bordo and Meissner (2012) empirically study the relationship between changes in
inequality and credit growth. Based on the dataset of Schularick and Taylor (2012),
they use the amount of outstanding bank loans to the private sector as an indicator
for household debt. The inequality measure in their study is the share of income
of the top 1%. By using panel data on 14 advanced countries for the period from
1920 to 2000, they do not find a significant relationship between inequality growth
and credit changes. Instead, interest rates and GDP per capita growth are robust
determinants of credit booms. However, their study suffers from several limitations
in order to test for the inequality-household debt relation set up by Rajan (2010)
and used in Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) and Iacoviello (2008). First, the
theoretical frameworks by Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) and Iacoviello (2008)
model the connection between inequality and debt of private households. By using
total loans to the private sector, credit to businesses is also included in the dependent
variable used by Bordo and Meissner (2012). Given an increase in bank loans to
businesses, the times series of Schularick and Taylor (2012) rises, while, ceteris paribus,
credit to the household sector stays constant. Therefore, by using time series which
explicitly measure credit to the household sector, I can investigate the relationship
between inequality and household debt in more detail compared to Bordo and Meissner
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(2012). Second, the authors just consider one inequality measure in their study and
do not check whether their results still hold when alternative inequality variables are
considered. Finally and most importantly, the theoretical works by Kumhof, Rancière,
and Winant (2015) and Iacoviello (2008) show that there exists a trending long-run
relation between income inequality and household debt. By using growth rates this
trend is removed and finally just short-run dynamics remain. If, however, there is a
long-run relationship between inequality and household debt, using growth rates of the
variables of interest may lead to biased inference on the effect of inequality on private
debt (Engle and Granger, 1987; Johansen and Juselius, 1990). In addition, as pointed
out by Iacoviello (2008) short-run dynamics of household debt can well be explained
by business cycle fluctuations while debt and inequality are mainly connected in the
long-run. Therefore, it should not be surprising that short-run changes in GDP per
capita and interest rates are significant regressors in explaining loans growth as shown
by Bordo and Meissner (2012). In testing for the existence of a long-run relationship
between household debt and inequality both variables should be considered in levels
which is possible within the cointegration approach applied in my study.
1.3 Panel Cointegration Tests
The cointegration approach which allows testing for the presence of long-run relation-
ships among integrated variables is a popular tool in the empirical literature (Breitung
and Pesaran, 2005). However, most of the tests have only low power when applied to
single unit time series mainly available just after World War II (Pedroni, 2004). Due
to this dilemma, it seems natural to expand the underlying sample by including ad-
ditional cross-sectional data and studying cointegration relationships within a pooled
time series panel. Moreover, by applying cointegration tests, I am able to consider
the variables of interest measured in levels. Therefore, my approach can be seen as
more precise way for studying the existence of a long-run relationship between levels
of income inequality and household debt.
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In the following, I present two commonly used panel cointegration tests: the Pedroni
(1999, 2004) and Westerlund (2007) test.
1.3.1 Pedroni Test
Engle and Granger (1987) developed the cointegration idea for single unit time-series.
The underlying test is based on an examination of the residuals of a regression per-
formed using I(1) variables. A necessary condition for a cointegration relationship
between these variables is that the residuals of the regression should be I(0). In con-
trast, if the residuals are I(1) then cointegration does not exist and therefore there is no
long-run steady-state relation between the variables of interest. Pedroni (1999, 2004)
extend the Engle-Granger residual-based approach to the panel data setting.
The Pedroni test requires to compute the residuals from the hypothesized cointegra-
tion regression. Therefore, consider the following regression
yit = δ′idt + βixit + eit, (1.1)
where t = 1, ..., T represents the time index and i = 1, ..., N stands for the cross-
sectional units. dt contains the deterministic components, which can take three different
specifications. When no deterministic trend is included in equation (1.1), then dt = 0,
while dt = 1 in the case that yit is modeled with an individual constant term. Finally,
for dt = (1, t)
′ , yit is modeled with an individual constant and a time trend. Note that
individual specific fixed effects and deterministic trends are allowed via the parameter
δi. Additionally, the slope coefficients βi can vary across individuals.
Both variables of interest yit and xit are assumed to be I(1) for each cross-sectional
unit i. Following the Engle-Granger approach, under the null hypothesis of no cointe-
gration the error term eit should also be I(1). This can be studied by first obtaining
the residuals from equation (1.1), êit = yit − δ̂′idt − β̂ixit, and then to test whether
residuals are I(1) by running the auxiliary regression for every cross-section
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êit = ρiêi,t−1 + uit
or
êit = ρiêi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
ψij∆êi,t−j + vit,
where E [uitujs] = 0 ∀s, t, i 6= j and E [vitvjs] = 0 ∀s, t, i 6= j. Thus, the individual
processes are assumed to be independent and identically distributed cross-sectionally,
i.e. the Pedroni test does not allow for cross-sectional correlation. Pedroni (2004)
suggests seven different statistics for testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration
(ρi = 1). Four out of these statistics test the null hypothesis H0 : ρi = 1 for all i, versus
the alternative hypothesis Hp1 : ρi = ρ < 1 for all i, so that a common autoregressive
coefficient is presumed. Pedroni calls these four tests the within-dimension or panel
cointegration tests. In contrast, if the autoregressive coefficients are allowed to vary
between the cross-sectional units, the null hypothesisH0 : ρi = 1 for all i is tested versus
the alternative hypothesis Hg1 : ρi < 1 for all i. Pedroni terms these remaining three
tests the between-dimension or group mean panel cointegration tests. By allowing for
individual specific autoregressive coefficients, the between-dimension-based statistics
take one additional source of heterogeneity into account.
1.3.2 Westerlund Test
While the first generation panel cointegration tests do not allow for cross-sectional
correlation, tests of the second generation explicitly consider such dependencies.
One example of a second generation panel cointegration test is the test proposed
by Westerlund (2007). In contrast to the residual-based approach, Westerlund (2007)
develops an error correction-based cointegration test. The null hypothesis of no cointe-
gration is tested by inferring whether the error-correction term in a conditional panel
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error-correction model is equal to zero. This test does not rely on the common factor
restriction and by employing a bootstrap approach, inference is possible even under
general forms of cross-sectional dependence. In addition, as simulation results in West-
erlund (2007) show, the test has good small-sample properties.
The error-correction tests are based on the following data-generating process:
∆yit = δ′idt + αi(yi,t−1 − β′ixi,t−1) +
pi∑
j=1
αij∆yi,t−j +
pi∑
j=−qi
γij∆xi,t−j + eit. (1.2)
Again, dt contains the deterministic components, which can take one of the three
specifications already described above.
Equation (1.2) can be rewritten as
∆yit = δ′idt + αiyi,t−1 + λ′ixi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
αij∆yi,t−j +
pi∑
j=−qi
γij∆xi,t−j + eit, (1.3)
where λ′i = −αiβ ′i. The equilibrium relationship of the system is given by yi,t−1 −
β
′
ixi,t−1. Therefore, αi captures the speed at which the system converts back to equi-
librium after an exogenous shock occurred. If αi < 0, then error correction is present,
which implies that there exists a cointegration relationship between yit and xit. How-
ever, if αi = 0, then error correction does not happen and, thus, there is no coin-
tegration relationship. Following these considerations, Westerlund (2007) states the
null hypothesis of no cointegration as H0 : αi = 0 for all i. What is considered as
the alternative hypothesis depends on the assumption about the homogeneity of αi.
If the αi’s are not required to be equal for all cross-sectional units, then H0 is tested
versus the alternative hypothesis Hg1 : αi < 0 for at least one i. This is done by the
two so called group-mean tests. A second pair of tests, so called panel tests, make the
assumption that αi is equal across all cross-sectional units i. Thus, these panel tests
are designed to test H0 versus Hp1 : αi = α < 0 for all units i. The distinction between
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panel and group-mean cointegration tests is similar for the Pedroni and Westerlund
test statistics.
The group-mean tests of the Westerlund (2007) approach can be obtained by the
following three steps: First equation (1.3) is estimated by least squares for each cross-
sectional unit i. This leads to
∆yit = δ̂′idt + α̂iyi,t−1 + λ̂′ixi,t−1 +
pi∑
j=1
α̂ij∆yi,t−j +
pi∑
j=−qi
γ̂ij∆xi,t−j + êit, (1.4)
where a caret ˆ reflects estimated parameters. Note that pi and qi which determine the
lag and lead orders, respectively, are allowed to vary across individuals. By estimating
equation (1.3), êit and γ̂ij are obtained. In a second step, one computes
ûit =
pi∑
j=−qi
γ̂ij∆xi,t−j + êit.
Based on ûit and ∆yit, the usual Newey and West (1994) long-run variance estimators
ω̂ui and ω̂yi, respectively, can be constructed. These estimators are then used to obtain
α̂i(1) = ω̂ui/ω̂yi. In the third and last step, the group-mean tests are computed as
follows:
Gτ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
α̂i
SE(α̂i)
, Gα =
1
N
N∑
i=1
T α̂i
α̂i(1)
,
where SE(α̂i) represents the usual standard error of α̂i.
The panel tests are also computed in three separate steps. Similar to the group-mean
tests, the first step is to regress ∆yit and yi,t−1 on dt, the lagged values of ∆yit, and
the contemporaneous and lagged realizations of ∆xit. Following this procedure, the
projection errors can be obtained
17
∆y˜it = ∆yit − δ̂′idt − λ̂′ixi,t−1 −
pi∑
j=1
α̂ij∆yi,t−j −
pi∑
j=−pi
γ̂ij∆xi,t−j,
and
y˜i,t−1 = yi,t−1 − δ̂′idt − λ̂′ixi,t−1 −
pi∑
j=1
α̂ij∆yi,t−j −
pi∑
j=−pi
γ̂ij∆xi,t−j.
By using the values for ∆y˜it and y˜i,t−1, the common error-correction parameter, α, and
its standard error are estimated in a second step.
α̂ =
(
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
y˜2i,t−1
)−1 N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
1
α̂i(1)
y˜i,t−1∆y˜it.
The standard error of α̂ is given by
SE(α̂) =
(
(Ŝ2N)−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=2
y˜2i,t−1
)−1/2
where Ŝ2N =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ŝ2i .
Now suppose σ̂i denotes the estimated standard error in equation (1.4). Then Ŝi is
defined as σ̂i/α̂i(1).
The last step consists of computing the panel statistics as
Pτ =
α̂
SE(α̂) , Pα = T α̂.
To account for cross-sectional dependency within the panel, a bootstrap approach based
on Chang (2004) can be applied. The method consists of the following steps.
First, the least-squares regression is fitted,
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∆yit =
pi∑
j=1
α̂ij∆yi,t−j +
pi∑
j=−qi
γ̂ij∆xi,t−j + êit. (1.5)
By using the results of equation (1.5), the vector ω̂t = (ê
′
t,∆x
′
t)
′ can be computed. Here
êt and ∆xt are vectors which contain stacked observations on êit and ∆xit, respectively.
In the next step, bootstrap samples ω∗t = (e∗
′
t ,∆x∗
′
t )
′ are generated by sampling with
replacement the centered residual vector,
ω˜t = ω̂t − 1
T − 1
T∑
j=1
ω̂j.
Then the bootstrap sample ∆y∗it is generated. This is done by first computing the
bootstrap values of the composite error term, uit, via
u∗it =
pi∑
j=−qi
γ̂ij∆x∗i,t−j + e∗it.
γ̂ij is obtained by the least-squares regression of equation (1.5). For a set of pi initial
values, ∆y∗it can then be generated recursively from u∗it as follows:
∆y∗it =
pi∑
j=1
α̂ij∆y∗i,t−j + u∗it.
Once again α̂ij results from the estimation of equation (1.5). In the final step y∗it and
x∗it are generated as
y∗it = y∗i0 +
t∑
j=1
∆y∗ij, x∗it = x∗i0 +
t∑
j=1
∆x∗ij.
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This step requires initiation through x∗i0 and y∗i0 which are set to zero for simplicity.
Following this method step by step, leads to the bootstrap sample y∗it and x∗it and
to the bootstrapped error-correction test. Let t∗1 denote the initial bootstrap test.
By repeating this procedure S times, one will obtain t∗1, ..., t∗S, which represents the
boostrap distribution of the test. The null hypothesis is then rejected if the calculated
sample value of the statistic is smaller than the critical value of a lower quantile (e.g.
1%) of the bootstrap distribution.
The Pedroni and Westerlund panel cointegration tests will be applied for testing for
the presence of a long-run relationship between inequality and household debt.
1.4 Data and Unit Root Tests
The underlying panel of the study consists of nine industrialized countries: Australia,
Canada, France, Great-Britain, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and United States. The
baseline dataset covers the period from 1953 to 2008. The main data of this study
are income inequality and household debt. Four different inequality series are used:
the top 1% income share, the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient, the labor income
share, and the Gini index. The top 1 % income share and the inverted Pareto-Lorenz
coefficient are taken from the World Top Incomes Database (Atkinson, Piketty, and
Saez, 2011), while the Gini index data come from the University of Texas Inequality
Project (Galbraith and Kum, 2005). The inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient measures
the ratio between the average income y∗(y) of individuals with income above threshold
y and the threshold y (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011). Additionally, the value
of the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient does not depend on the threshold y. That
is, if the coefficient equals two, the average income of individuals with income above
$100,000 is $200,000 and the average income of individuals with income above $1
million is $2 million. Intuitively, a higher inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient leads to
a fatter upper tail of the income distribution. Data on the labor share of incomes are
provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
While the top 1% income share, inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient, and Gini index
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measure income distributions between persons or households, the labor income share
indicates the distribution between the two factors capital and labor.
As an indicator for household debt, I use series on the outstanding amount of credit
to private households and non-profit institutions serving households offered by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). These series measure credit to the household
sector and are a more precise indicator for household debt than the bank loans variable
offered by Schularick and Taylor (2012) which also includes bank loans to the business
sector. However, for most of the countries included in the sample, the BIS data cover
only a relatively short time-span (early 1970s to 2007). Therefore, the loans series
from Schularick and Taylor (2012) which is available for a longer time horizon will
also be considered as a second indicator for household debt. Nevertheless, in order to
accurately test for a long-run relationship between inequality and household debt, the
BIS credit series will be of primary importance in the following. There are few yearly
observations missing within the dataset, which are replaced by averages of the values
preceding and following the missing observations.2
Figure 1.1 presents the time series of sample averages of the yearly growth rate
of log of real household debt per capita based on the BIS dataset and on real loans
per capita calculated from the Schularick and Taylor (2012) data. To obtain real
variables, household credit as well as total bank loans are deflated by the Consumer
Price index also included in the Schularick and Taylor (2012) dataset. As can be seen, at
cyclical frequencies, both series move together and are strongly correlated (the overall
correlation coefficient equals 0.63 and is highly significant). This observation suggests,
while the BIS credit series more precisely measures credit to private households, the
total bank loans variable by Schularick and Taylor (2012) follows a similar growth
pattern over time.
2For more details on the data see Appendix.
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Figure 1.1: Household Debt and Bank Loans
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1.4.1 Unit Root Tests on Bounded Variables
In order to study whether there exists a cointegration relationship between inequality
and household debt, both variables should mimic a unit root process. It seems crucial
to model the data generating process for variables like the top 1% income share, labor
income share, and Gini index as pure unit root processes, since ultimately these vari-
ables are bounded between the values zero and 100. It is well known that a random
walk process crosses any finite bound with probability one (Jones, 1995). However,
a random walk is a special case of an unit root process, namely it is linear with an
additive Gaussian error (Barr and Cuthbertson, 1991). To overcome this dilemma, in
the empirical literature it is preferred to think of the unit root process as a feature
which describes the local behavior of the bounded series within the sample (e.g. Barr
and Cuthbertson, 1991; Francis and Ramey, 2005; Guest and Swift, 2008; Herzer and
Vollmer, 2012; Hurlin, 2010; Jones, 1995; Malinen, 2012; Pedroni, 2007; Young and
Dove, 2013). Consequently, the unit root process is not seen as a global property
but rather as a valid approximation of the underlying bounded time series within the
22
sample period. As pointed out by Pedroni (2007), if the determining factors of these
bounded variables, such as taste, time preferences, and government policies, change
over time, the series will show permanent movements that can be well described by a
unit root process.
Following this line of reasoning, Pedroni (2007), Young and Dove (2013), Francis
and Ramey (2005), Jones (1995), Barr and Cuthbertson (1991), and Hurlin (2010) do
not reject the unit root hypothesis for several bounded variables such as investment
shares, unemployment rates, bank reserve ratios, government shares of output, hours
per capita, and tax rates. Herzer and Vollmer (2012), Guest and Swift (2008), and
Malinen (2012) use unit root tests for studying the local behavior of different inequality
measures.
Cavaliere and Xu (2014) show that conventional unit root tests tend to overreject the
null hypothesis when applied to limited time series. Nevertheless, they also mention
that unit root tests do not suffer from biased inference when the bounds are sufficiently
far away. As all limited inequality measures considered in this study move far away
from both bounds (0 and 100) and do not cross one of the bounds within the sample
period, applying conventional unit root tests should not be seen as a severe problem
here.
By following the aforementioned empirical literature, I approximate persistent changes
in the top 1% income share, labor share of income, and Gini index as unit root pro-
cesses. It seems reasonable to assume that the behavior of the bounded variables can
be mimicked by a unit root data generating process (Francis and Ramey, 2005). This
is done by applying two conventional panel unit root tests on the underlying inequality
time series: the Fisher type ADF test as developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) and the
Pesaran (2007) test. While the Maddala and Wu (1999) test belongs to the so-called
first generation panel unit root tests, the test developed by Pesaran (2007) is a second
generation panel unit root test (Breitung and Pesaran, 2005). The Maddala and Wu
(1999) test allows for heterogeneity in the autoregressive coefficient of the Dickey-Fuller
regression but ignores cross-sectional dependence in the data. In contrast, the Pesaran
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Table 1.1: Panel Unit Root Tests
Levels First differences
Maddala/Wu Pesaran Maddala/Wu Pesaran
Credit 16.02 1.03 40.67∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗
Loans 17.27 1.58 82.25∗∗∗ −6.87∗∗∗
Top 1% 6.58 −1.17 55.72∗∗∗ −4.51∗∗∗
Ilc 8.26 −0.63 70.47∗∗∗ −1.75∗∗
Labor share 14.47 0.36 54.06∗∗∗ −1.93∗∗
Gini 17.59 0.32 58.89∗∗∗ −4.41∗∗∗
All tests include individual constants and time trends. The null hypothesis is that the
variable has a unit-root. *** Rejection at the 1% significant level; ** Rejection at the
5% significant level.
(2007) test assumes individual unit root processes but also allows for cross-sectional
correlation in the underlying sample.
1.4.2 Unit Root Test Results
Table 1.1 presents results of the two panel unit root tests on the six variables of interest.
All tests include individual constants and time trends. For all series the null hypothesis
of a unit root can not be rejected when the variables are measured in levels. In contrast,
when first differences are used, the Maddala andWu test rejects the unit root hypothesis
at the 1% level for all series. According to the Pesaran test statistics, first differences
of the loans, top 1% income share, and Gini index reject the null hypothesis at the 1%
level, while first differenced series on credit, inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient (Ilc),
and labor share of income can be approximated as stationary processes at the 5%
level. Thus, the test results do not differ significantly when cross-sectional correlation
is taken into account. Cavaliere and Xu (2014) show that unit root tests tend to
overreject the null hypothesis of a unit root when applied to bounded series. This
finding strengthens the result of a unit root present in the limited inequality measures,
as the null hypothesis can not be rejected for all relevant cases. Therefore, I conclude
that both credit variables as well as the four inequality series are integrated of order
one. This finding is a first prerequisite for applying cointegration tests.
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1.5 Cointegration Test Results
According to the unit root test results reported in Table 1.1, stochastic trends drive
the time series of both debt series and of all four inequality measures. In a next step, it
will be tested if there exists a stationary linear combination between the nonstationary
household debt and inequality variables, i.e. if the series are cointegrated. Two panel
cointegration tests will be used. The first one is the panel cointegration test proposed by
Pedroni (1999, 2004) and the second is the cointegration test developed by Westerlund
(2007).
For the Pedroni test, I just report the test results applying the augmented Dickey
and Fuller (ADF) principle, because, as shown in Wagner and Hlouskova (2010), those
test statistics are least affected by cross-sectional correlation. In addition, these test
statistics show good small sample properties (Wagner and Hlouskova, 2010). For the
Westerlund test all four test statistics will be presented.
The model for testing for cointegration between inequality and household debt is:
log(real credit per capita)it = δ′idt + βiinequalityit + eit, (1.6)
where the level of real credit per capita is explained by the level of inequality, and
(1,−βi) is the country-specific cointegration vector between credit and inequality. Due
to heterogeneity of the data, individual constants and time trends are included in dt.
Real credit is either measured via real credit to private households from the BIS series or
via real bank loans as included in the Schularick and Taylor (2012) dataset. Inequality
is measured by the top 1% income share, the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient, the
labor income share, and the Gini index, respectively. Although some of the inequality
measures are bounded, I assume that the long-run relationship between unlimited
real credit per capita and possible limited inequality can well be approximated by a
linear relationship as modeled in equation (1.6). This assumption is backed by the
observation that all three limited inequality series move far away from their bounds
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within the sample period. As found by Cavaliere (2006), standard asymptotic theory
continues to provide a usefull approximation when the bounds of the limited series are
sufficiently far away which is the case for the inequality series considered here. Results
of the panel cointegration tests based on equation (1.6) are reported in Table 1.2.
The upper part of Table 1.2 presents the results of cointegration tests based on the
Pedroni (1999, 2004) ADF test statistics. While the panel ADF statistics assume a
common autoregressive coefficient, group ADF statistics allow for individual specific
autoregressive coefficients. Weighted panel ADF statistics refer to statistics weighted
by country-specific long-run conditional variances.
19 out of the 24 test statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (at 10%
level) between real credit per capita, measured as real credit to private households or
real bank loans, respectively, and one of the four inequality series considered. Even
at the 5% significant level, 16 out of the 24 test statistics reject the no cointegration
hypothesis. When real credit to private household is used as dependent variable, the
null hypothesis can be rejected at the 10% level for 10 out of the 12 test statistics. The
hypothesis of no cointegration between real credit to private households per capita and
the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient can only be rejected for the group ADF statistics.
When real bank loans are considered as a measure for private debt, the null hypothesis
is rejected in nine out of the 12 cases. None of the Pedroni ADF statistics reject the
no cointegration hypothesis between real bank loans per capita and the labor share at
common significance levels.
The lower part of Table 1.2 reports the test results based on the Westerlund (2007)
panel cointegration test which explicitly allows for cross-sectional correlation within
the panel. p-values for the cointegration tests are calculated by bootstrap methods,
where 800 replications are used. For each possible cointegration relationship two group
mean tests (Gτ , Gα) and two panel tests (Pτ , Pα) as proposed by Westerlund (2007)
are shown.
When allowing for cross-sectional dependency, the test statistics mainly support the
hypothesis of cointegration between private debt and inequality. 26 out of the 32 test
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Table 1.2: Panel Cointegration Test Statistics
Pedroni ADF statistics
Dependent variable Credit
Top 1% Ilc Labor share Gini
Panel ADF stat −2.14∗∗ −0.54 −2.06∗∗ −2.72∗∗∗
weighted −2.32∗∗∗ −0.99 −2.19∗∗∗ −2.71∗∗∗
Group ADF stat −2.25∗∗∗ −1.89∗∗ −1.29∗ −3.91∗∗∗
Dependent variable Loans
Top 1% Ilc Labor share Gini
Panel ADF stat −1.97∗∗ −2.59∗∗∗ −1.01 −1.35∗
weighted −2.03∗∗ −3.04∗∗∗ −0.75 −1.28∗
Group ADF stat −1.85∗∗ −2.52∗∗∗ −0.39 −1.68∗∗
Westerlund test statistics
Dependent variable Credit
Top 1% Ilc Labor share Gini
Gτ −2.89∗∗ −2.86∗∗ −2.96∗∗ −2.25∗
Gα −12.65 −11.66 −11.04 −8.83
Pτ −5.84∗ −7.88∗∗∗ −7.07∗∗ −5.32∗
Pα −12.13∗ −12.37∗ −11.17∗ −6.53
Dependent variable Loans
Top 1% Ilc Labor share Gini
Gτ −2.99∗∗ −3.06∗∗ −3.29∗∗∗ −2.77∗
Gα −13.80∗ −13.98∗∗ −11.32 −15.06∗∗
Pτ −6.86∗∗ −7.44∗∗∗ −7.15∗∗ −6.41∗
Pα −13.50∗∗ −14.13∗∗∗ −12.85∗ −14.88∗∗∗
All tests include individual constants and time trends. “Weighted” refers to statistics
weighted by country-specific long-run conditional variances. “Gτ” and “Gα” represent group
mean test, while “Pτ” and “Pα” show panel tests. The null hypothesis is that the variables
are not cointegrated. *** Rejection at the 1% significant level; ** Rejection at the 5% sig-
nificant level; * Rejection at the 10% significant level.
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statistics reported reject the no cointegration hypothesis at the 10% level. When real
credit to private households per capita is considered as dependent variable, the null
hypothesis can be rejected at the 10% level for 11 out of the 16 test statistics. If, in
contrast, real bank loans per capita are considered as endogenous, 15 out of the 16
test statistics reject the no cointegration hypothesis. Cointegration between both real
credit per capita measures and income disparity is present for all four inequality series
considered.
When taking the findings of both cointegration tests together together, 45 out of
the 56 test statistics calculated find that inequality and real credit per capita are
cointegrated of order one at the 10% level. 27 out of the 32 panel test statistics and 18
out of the 24 group mean test statistics reject the no cointegration hypothesis at the
10% significant level. There are no significant differences whether real credit to private
households or real total bank loans is used as measure for real credit. This finding seems
surprising as it implies that including credit to the business sector in the household
debt variable does not lead to different results when investigating the existence of
a long-run relation between household debt and income inequality. Explaining this
strong connection between total bank loans and household credit could be the subject
of future research. The test results also indicate that cointegration is present for all
four inequality series considered. Therefore, one can conclude that there exists a long-
run relationship between inequality and household debt, i.e. that both variables have
a long-run steady-state relation. This relation is present for different measures of
real credit per capita and alternative inequality indicators. This finding supports the
existence of a long-run relationship between inequality and household debt as modeled
in Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) and Iacoviello (2008).
1.6 Long-run Relationship
After showing that there exists a cointegrated relationship, I want to consistently es-
timate the long-run effect of inequality on household debt. In doing so, the between-
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Table 1.3: DOLS Estimates
Loans Credit
Top 1% 0.065∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.011) (0.025)
Ilc 0.029∗∗ 0.045∗
(0.012) (0.025)
Labor share −0.035∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.0008)
Gini 0.037∗ 0.045∗
(0.019) (0.024)
Standard erros are presented in parentheses. All estimations include
individual constants and time trends. *** Significance at the 1% level;
** Significance at the 5% level; * Significance at the 10% level.
dimension group mean panel dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator as proposed by Pedroni
(2001) will be applied. The DOLS regression in my case is given by
log(real credit per capita)it = δ′idt + βiinequalityit +
ki∑
j=−ki
φij∆inequalityi,t−j + eit,
where φij is a coefficient vector of lead and lag inequality differences which accounts
for possible serial correlation and endogeneitiy of the regressor. The number of leads
and lags can vary between the panel members. In the presence of cointegration the
group mean panel DOLS estimator is superconsistent implying that the estimator for
β converges to the true value at a faster rate than normal. The estimator is also robust
to the omission of variables that do not form part of the cointegration relationship.
In addition, Wagner and Hlouskova (2010) have shown that the DOLS estimator per-
forms best in the case of cross-sectional correlation compared to several other panel
cointegration estimators.
The between estimator for β is calculated as
β̂ = N−1
N∑
i=1
β̂i,
29
where β̂i is the conventional time-series DOLS estimator (Stock and Watson, 1993)
applied to the ith unit of the panel. The associated t-statistic for the between estimator
can be constructed as
t
β̂
= N−1/2
N∑
i=1
t
β̂i
.
The test statistics constructed from the between estimator are designed to test the null
hypothesis H0 : βi = 0 for all i against the alternative hypothesis H1 : βi 6= 0. Note
that under the alternative hypothesis, the values for βi are not constrained to be the
same across the panel units.
The DOLS estimates for the coefficients on the different inequality measures are
reported in Table 1.3. The log of real total bank loans per capita as well as the log of
real credit to private households per capita are used as dependent variable, respectively.
All estimations include individual constants and time trends.
The results show that all inequality coefficients are statistically significant and have
the expected signs. While the top 1% income share, the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coeffi-
cient, and the Gini index influence loans (and credit) positively, an increase in the labor
share leads to a reduction in the respective dependent variable. When real loans are
used as dependent variable, the absolute value of the different inequality coefficients
ranges between 0.029 and 0.065, implying that, in the long-run, a one percentage point
increase (one unit increase for the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient) in inequality leads
to a rise in real loans per capita by 2.9% to 6.5%. When real credit to private house-
holds is considered, a one percentage point (one unit) increase in inequality increases
credit by 2% to 6.4%. The highest absolute coefficient values result when using the
top 1% income share as regressor. The estimates are 0.065 and 0.064.
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1.7 Conclusion
There is a growing interest in the relationship between income inequality, household
debt, and the outburst of a financial crisis (e.g. Morelli and Atkinson, 2015; Rajan,
2010). Although in theoretical works by Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015) and
Iacoviello (2008) rising income inequality leads to an increase in household debt, there
is only a small literature testing for this relationship empirically. By studying the ef-
fect of changes in income inequality on bank loans growth, Bordo and Meissner (2012)
find that rises in top income shares are no significant determinant in explaining credit
booms. Similar Morelli and Atkinson (2015) conclude that there is no causal relation-
ship between rising income inequality and economic crises. However, both studies do
not investigate whether there exists a relation between the levels of income inequality
and private debt. Moreover, the models developed by Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant
(2015) and Iacoviello (2008) explicitly use a connection between levels of income in-
equality and household debt. Therefore, the results by Bordo and Meissner (2012)
and Morelli and Atkinson (2015) should not be seen as a rejection for the inequality-
credit-crisis nexus hypothesized by Rajan (2010) and modeled by Kumhof, Rancière,
and Winant (2015) and Iacoviello (2008).
By applying panel cointegration techniques, I have studied whether there exists
an empirical long-run relation between the levels of income inequality and household
debt. I have used two different measures for household debt; the private household
credit series offered by the BIS and the broader Schularick and Taylor (2012) total
bank loans series which also includes loans to the business sector. Additionally, four
alternative inequality indicators were considered; the top 1% income share, the inverted
Pareto-Lorenz coefficient, the Gini index, and the labor share of income. In testing
for a cointegrated relationship between inequality and household debt, the Pedroni
(1999, 2004) and Westerlund (2007) panel cointegration tests were applied. While the
Pedroni test does not allow for cross-sectional correlation, a bootstrapped version of
the Westerlund test makes inference under cross-sectional dependence possible.
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45 out of the 56 test statistics calculated have rejected the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. The results have shown no significant differences whether the household
credit or total bank loans series is used as dependent variable. Additionally, the test
results were robust to all four inequality measures. Therefore, it seems reasonable
to conclude that there exists a long-run relationship between income inequality and
leverage in developed economies which is in accordance with the theories by Iacoviello
(2008), Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015), and Rajan (2010). DOLS regressions
suggest that, in the long-run, the effect of a one-percentage point increase in inequality
on real loans/household credit per capita lies between 2% and 6.5%, depending on the
inequality measure used.
Finally, the results by Bordo and Meissner (2012) may be considered as biased as
they use first differenced variables and hence remove the long-run trend and focus
on the short-term effects of changes in inequality on credit growth. Following this
consideration, the finding by Bordo and Meissner (2012) is in line with Iacoviello (2008),
who points out that in the short-run there is no significant relation between income
inequality and household debt. At cyclical frequencies, economic activity can account
for the short-run changes in household debt. In contrast, my panel cointegration results
support the theoretical hypothesis of Iacoviello (2008) who finds that the long-run
increase in private debt is attributed to the persistent increase in income inequality.
Therefore, the cointegration approach which allows to use levels of the variables of
interest seems to be more appropriate to test for the inequality-credit relation than
using growth rates as done in Bordo and Meissner (2012).
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1.A Appendix
The following nine countries are part of the underlying panel used in this study: Aus-
tralia, Canada, France, Great-Britain, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden and United States.
Table A1.1: Data Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source Missing Observations
Bank Loans End-of-year amount of out-
standing domestic currency
lending by domestic banks to
domestic households and nonfi-
nancial corporations (excluding
lending within the financial
system)
Schularick and Tay-
lor (2012)
None
Credit Outstanding amount of credit
to households and non-profit in-
stitutions serving households at
the end of the year
Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements
None
Top 1% Income
Share
Share of pre-tax household in-
come received by the top 1 %
World Top Incomes
Database
Great Britain: 1961, 1980;
Italy: 1996, 1997; Norway: 1956
Inverted Pareto-
Lorenz Coefficient
Ratio between the average
income y∗(y) of individuals
with income above threshold y
and the threshold y (Atkinson,
Piketty, and Saez, 2011)
World Top Incomes
Database
Great Britain: 1980; Italy:
1996, 1997; Norway: 1956
Labor Incomes Share Share of national income rep-
resented by wages, salaries and
benefits
OECD None
Gini Index Extent to which the distribu-
tion of income among house-
holds within an economy devi-
ates from a perfectly equal dis-
tribution
Texas Inequality
Project
France: 1995; Italy: 1988;
United State: 2002, 2003
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2 Income Redistribution, Consumer Credit,
and Keeping up with the Riches
Co-author: Christopher Krause
Abstract
In this study, the relation between consumer credit and real economic activity during
the Great Moderation is studied in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
Our model economy is populated by two different household types. Investors, who
hold the economy’s capital stock, own the firms and supply credit, and workers, who
supply labor and demand credit to finance consumption. Furthermore, workers seek
to minimize the difference between investors’ and their own consumption level. We
find a positive significant value for the workers’ keeping up-parameter by matching
business cycle statistics. Thus, our paper provides macro-evidence for the relevance of
consumption externalities in explaining credit dynamics.
Keywords: Consumer Credit, Relative Consumption Motive, Business Cycles.
JEL Codes: E21, E32, E44.
2.1 Introduction
This study provides macro-evidence for the relevance of consumption externalities be-
tween different income groups. For this purpose, we propose a dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model with consumption externalities that is able to replicate
consumer credit dynamics during the Great Moderation. By estimating deep model
parameters, we show that consumption externalities are a significant determinant in
explaining credit fluctuations over the business cycle. Our paper contributes to the
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literatures as it integrates a well-founded mechanism into a standard DSGE model to
explain short-run credit movements.
Recent empirical studies show that consumption externalities significantly affect in-
dividuals’ consumption decisions. Bertrand and Morse (2013) find empirical support
for so-called “trickle-down-consumption”, meaning that rising income and consump-
tion at the top of the income distribution induces households in the lower parts of the
distribution to consume a larger share of their income. Focusing on the period between
the early 1980s and 2008, the authors present evidence for a negative relationship be-
tween income inequality and the savings rate of middle-income households. Carr and
Jayadev (2015) show that rising indebtedness of US households is directly related to
high levels of income inequality. The authors conclude that relative income concerns
explain a significant part of the strong increase in household leverage for the period
1999-2009. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, Drechsel-Grau and
Schmid (2014) demonstrate that upward looking comparison is a significant determi-
nant of individuals’ consumption decisions.
Concerning the interrelation between relative consumption concerns and private debt
dynamics, there is no conclusive evidence. Bertrand and Morse (2013) provide indirect
evidence that non-rich households rely on easier access to credit to finance their desired
keeping up with richer co-residents. Moreover, they find that a positive relationship be-
tween the number of personal bankruptcy fillings and top income levels. Georgarakos,
Haliassos, and Pasini (2014) show that a higher average income increases the tendency
to borrow of households with incomes below average. Contrary, Coibion et al. (2014)
find that low-income households in high-inequality regions accumulate less debt than
similar households in low-inequality regions. However, their findings are mainly driven
by mortgages, whereas for our variable of interest, consumer credit, the authors only
find mixed results. Against this background, we show within a theoretical model that
relative consumption concerns are an essential driver of aggregate credit dynamics.
Understanding how unsecured consumer credit fluctuates over the business cycle is of
central importance because of several reasons. First, consumer credit makes up a signif-
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Table 2.1: Business Cycle Correlations (1982q1-2008q2)
Consumer credit
σxt/σDt ρ(xt, Dt)
Output 0.4568 0.1523
Consumption 0.2783 0.1658
Investment 1.7524 0.0852
Hours worked 0.5080 0.3603
Real wage 0.3994 −0.3207
Note: Consumer credit has been deflated using the price
index of personal consumption expenditures. All vari-
ables are logged and HP-filtered (smoothing parameter
of 1600) to obtain cyclical components. Standard errors
in parentheses are computed by the VARHAC-estimator
with automatic lag selection by the Bayesian informa-
tion criterion (see Den Haan and Levin, 1997). For data
definitions and sources see Appendix.
icant part of personal consumption expenditures. For our period of interest, the Great
Moderation3, credit averages 23% of aggregate personal consumption, indicating that
more than one fifth of private expenditures were financed by relying on consumer credit.
Second, short-run credit movements are characterized by a highly volatile behavior. As
Table 2.1 reports, credit is more than twice (three times) as volatile as output (con-
sumption). Third, and most importantly, business cycle correlations with other main
aggregate variables contradict standard theory in which credit represents an instrument
to smooth consumption in bad times. Table 2.1 shows positive co-movements between
credit and output and consumption, respectively. Moreover, credit is positively (neg-
atively) correlated with hours worked (real wages). The goal of this study is to show
that a dynamic framework which allows for consumption externalities leads to similar
credit statistics as reported in Table 2.1.
Our model economy is populated by two types of households. Investors, who hold the
economy’s entire capital stock, own firms and supply credit, and workers, who supply
labor and demand credit to finance their desired level of consumption. Moreover,
we include a mechanism through which workers value their own level of consumption
relative to the investors’ level of consumption, a mechanism we refer to as keeping up
3Following Iacoviello and Pavan (2013), and Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri (2013), among others, we
date the Great Moderation as the time span between the early 1980s (here 1982q1) and the outburst
of the financial crisis (2008q2).
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wit the Riches. Model dynamics are driven by four stochastic innovations, namely a
neutral technology, investment specific technology, price markup, and wage markup
shock.
We estimate deep parameters of the four-shock model by simulated methods of mo-
ments (SMM). The parameter measuring the degree of workers’ consumption external-
ities is estimated to be positive and significant which let us to conclude that keeping
up with the riches is a central driver of credit dynamics over the business cycle. The
models’ implied credit moments successfully account for the (targeted) business cycle
statistics as reported in Table 2.1. We also find that the estimated model replicates
standard output statistics, which are not targeted in the estimation. We interpret this
result as a further justification for our chosen model.
When taking a closer look at the dynamics of the estimated model version, we find
that the price markup shock and the investment specific technology shock produce
credit correlations which are perfectly in line with the empirical ones as reported in
Table 2.1. However, this is only true when we include the consumption externality
in the workers’ utility function. In a counterfactual analysis we abstract from the
relative consumption motive and find that the model dynamics to both shocks no more
correspond to the empirical counterparts. Notably, replicating the positive correlations
between credit, output, and consumption does rely on the keeping up mechanism. The
neutral technology shock and the wage markup shock produce model responses that
do not replicate the empirical credit correlations irrespective of the inclusion of the
relative consumption motive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section
3, the calibration strategy is described. Section 4 describes the models’ estimation and
presents its major results. In Section 5, we provide a detailed impulse response analysis
of the model. It turns out that consumption externalities are of major importance for
replicating credit dynamics. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 The Model Economy
This section outlines our baseline model, which consists of two types of households,
a continuum of firms producing intermediate goods, a representative final good firm,
and a representative labor bundler.
2.2.1 Households
The model economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households, indexed
on the unit interval. Following Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015), a fraction χ of
households, termed as investors (subscript i), holds the entire stock of physical capital
and owns firms, while the remaining fraction, 1− χ, termed as workers (subscript w),
makes up the entire labor force. Moreover, investors issue credit to workers. In contrast
to Kumhof, Rancière, and Winant (2015), we abstract from any default on credit. For
our period of interest, the Great Moderation, delinquency rates on consumer credit in
the US move around a stable mean and do not accelerate until the Great Recession.
Furthermore, the respective shares of households are fixed.
Investors: Investors maximize their lifetime utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtiUi(Ci,t), (2.1)
where βi ∈ (0, 1) is the specific discount factor of investors, and Ui(·) is the period
utility function. We assume that the level of consumption is the only argument of the
investors’ utility function.
Definition 1 (Investor’s utility function) We impose the following assumptions
on the investors’ utility function Ui.
(i) ∂Ui
∂Ci
> 0, ∂
2Ui
(∂Ci)2
< 0,
(ii) lim
C→∞
∂Ui
∂Ci
= 0, lim
C→0
∂Ui
∂Ci
=∞.
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Assumption (i) states that the utility function is strictly increasing and twice differ-
entiable in the investors’ level of consumption. Assumption (ii) ensures the concavity
of the utility function and that the Inada conditions hold.
The investors’ budget constraint is given by
Ci,t + Ii,t +QtDi,t ≤ Di,t−1 +RtKi,t−1 + Πt
χ
, (2.2)
where Ii,t denotes investment, Qt is the time t price of a credit that yields one unit of
output in t + 1, Rt is the rental rate of capital, and Πt/χ is the individual share of
profits from ownership of firms. The law of motion for physical capital is
Ki,t = (1− δ)Ki,t−1 + ζtIi,t, (2.3)
where δ is the depreciation rate. ζt denotes a shock to the relative price of investment
in terms of the consumption good. Similar to Born and Pfeifer (2014), we assume that
the shock follows an AR(2)-process around its steady state value ζ¯,
log ζt = (1− ρζ1 − ρζ2) log ζ¯ + ρζ1 log ζt−1 + ρζ2 log ζt−2 + εζ,t, (2.4)
where εζ,t i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ζ ), and |ρζ1 + ρζ2 | < 1.
Investors maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2) and (2.3) so that the first order conditions
are given by
Λi,t = U ′i(Ci,t), (2.5)
Λi,t = βiEtζtΛi,t+1
(
Rt+1 +
1− δ
ζt+1
)
, (2.6)
Λi,tQt = βiEtΛi,t+1. (2.7)
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Here, U ′i(·) denotes the first derivative of the utility function with respect to the argu-
ment in brackets, and Λi,t denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with (2.2). The
no-Ponzi-game constraint is given by
lim
j→∞
Et
Di,t+j∏j
s=0
1
Qt+s
≥ 0. (2.8)
Workers: Each working household j maximizes the utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtwUw (Cw,t, Xt, Nw,t(j)) , (2.9)
where βw ∈ (0, 1) is the specific discount factor of workers, Cw,t is the workers’ con-
sumption, Xt is a consumption externality that workers take as given, Nw,t is the
individual working effort, and Uw(·) is the period utility function.
Definition 2 (Worker’s utility function) We impose the following assumptions on
the workers’ utility function Uw.
(i) ∂Uw
∂Cw
> 0, ∂
2Uw
(∂Cw)2
< 0, ∂Uw
∂Nw
< 0, ∂
2Uw
(∂Nw)2
< 0,
(ii) ∂
2Uw
(∂Cw)2
∂2Uw
(∂Nw)2
− ∂
2Uw
∂Cw∂Nw
> 0,
(iii) lim
c→∞
∂Uw
∂Cw
= 0, lim
c→0
∂Uw
∂Cw
=∞,
(iv) ∂Uw
∂X
< 0, ∂
2Uw
∂Cw∂X
> 0.
Assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii) refer to the standard properties of utility functions,
namely that they are twice differentiable, strictly increasing in consumption, strictly
decreasing in labor, strictly concave and that Inada conditions are satisfied. The first
part of (iv) asserts that workers derive disutility from an increase in the consumption
externality. The second part states that the marginal utility of workers’ consumption
is increasing in the consumption externality, implying that if this externality rises,
workers wish to consume more since their marginal utility of consumption increases.4
4Including this consumption externality mechanism is backed by recent microeconometric studies,
which find that upward looking comparison significantly affect individuals consumption decisions
(Bertrand and Morse, 2013; Carr and Jayadev, 2015; Drechsel-Grau and Schmid, 2014).
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Workers face the following budget constraint,
Cw,t +Dw,t−1 ≤ Wt(j)Nw,t(j) +QtDw,t − φ2 (Dw,t − D¯w)
2, (2.10)
where Dw,t denotes received credit at price Qt, andWt(j) is the individual wage rate of
household j. The last term of (2.10) represents a quadratic cost of holding a quantity
of credit different from the steady state value D¯w. This assumption is needed to rule
out random walk components in the equilibrium dynamics of credit.5 Letting Λw,t be
the workers’ Lagrange multiplier on their budget constraint, the optimal choices for
consumption and credit demand are determined by
Λw,t = U ′w(Cw,t), (2.11)
Λw,t
[
Qt − φ
(
Dw,t − D¯w
)]
= βwEtΛw,t+1, (2.12)
where U ′w(·) denotes the first derivative of the utility function with respect to the
argument in brackets.
2.2.2 Final Good Firms
In this perfectly competitive sector, a representative firm produces final consumption
good Yt, combining a continuum of intermediate goods Yt(l), l ∈ [0, 1], using the tech-
nology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(l)
1
µt di
]µt
, (2.13)
with µt > 1. The elasticity µt follows an exogenous stochastic process around its steady
state value µ¯ given by
log µt = (1− ρµ) log µ¯+ ρµ log µt−1 + εµ,t, (2.14)
5Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) compare different modeling strategies that induce stationarity
within small open economy models.
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where εµ,t i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2µ), and 0 < ρµ < 1. The firm chooses intermediate inputs to
maximize profits subject to (2.13), which yields the demand function for intermediate
good l,
Yt(l) = Yt
(
Pt(l)
Pt
) µt
1−µt
, (2.15)
and subsequently the price index of the final good,
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(l)
1
1−µt di
]1−µt
. (2.16)
2.2.3 Intermediate Good Firms
Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm according
to a production function given by
Yt = ztF (Kt−1(l), Nt(l)), (2.17)
where we assume that F is strictly increasing, twice differentiable in both arguments,
exhibits constant returns to scale, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Kt−1(i) and Nt(i)
denote the quantity of capital and labor services utilized to produce intermediate good
l. zt is the technology level common across all firms and follows an exogenous stochastic
process around its steady state value z¯,
log zt = (1− ρz) log z¯ + ρz log zt−1 + εz,t, (2.18)
where εz,t i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2z), and 0 < ρz < 1.
Intermediate good firms maximize profits subject to the demand function (2.15) and
to cost minimization. We assume identical firms and that prices are perfectly flexible so
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that marginal costs are equal to 1/µt. Thus, the aggregate wage rate can be expressed
as a function of the marginal product of labor, MPLt, and µt,
Wt =
MPLt
µt
. (2.19)
Also, the aggregate rental rate o physical capital equals
Rt =
MPKt
µt
, (2.20)
whereMPKt measures the marginal product of capital. In the context of monopolistic
competition, µt is also known as the price markup.
Since workers make up the entire labor force, a positive shock to the price markup
shifts income from workers to investors. Thus, we refer to (2.14) as a redistribution
shock.6 Following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), among others, µt can also be
interpreted as the labor wedge on the firm side, as it drives a wedge between the wage
rate and the marginal product of labor.
2.2.4 Employment Agencies
As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), we assume that each working household j
is a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labor service, Nw,t(j). A representative
labor bundler, termed as employment agency, combines the intermediate labor services
into a homogenous labor input, Nw,t, using the technology
Nw,t =
[∫ 1
0
Nw,t(j)
1
νt dj
]νt
, (2.21)
with νt > 1. The elasticity νt follows an exogenous stochastic process around its steady
state value ν¯,
log νt = (1− ρν) log ν¯ + ρν log νt−1 + εν,t, (2.22)
6Throughout the paper, we use the two terms redistribution shock and price markup shock inter-
changeably.
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where εν,t i.i.d.∼ N (0, σ2ν), and 0 < ρν < 1. The labor bundler operates in a perfectly com-
petitive market such that profit maximization given (2.21) leads to the labor demand
function
Nw,t(j) = Nw,t
(
Wt(j)
Wt
) νt
1−νt
, (2.23)
where Wt is the aggregate wage rate. By substituting (2.23) into (2.21), we obtain the
following expression for the latter,
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1
1−νt dj
]1−νt
. (2.24)
We assume symmetric working households and, as for the final good price, that wages
are perfectly flexible. Thus, the wage rate is defined as a function of the marginal rate
of substitution, MRSt, and the wage markup, νt,
Wt = νtMRSt. (2.25)
In close analogy to the price markup, νt can be interpreted as the labor wedge on the
household side. In a perfectly competitive economy, µt and νt would be one such that
wages equal the marginal product of labor on the one hand, and the marginal rate of
substitution on the other.
2.2.5 Aggregation and Market Clearing
Aggregates are defined as the weighted average of the respective variables for each
household type. Hence, we get
Ct = χCi,t + (1− χ)Cw,t, (2.26)
Kt = χKi,t, (2.27)
It = χIi,t, (2.28)
Nt = (1− χ)Nw,t. (2.29)
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Credit market clearing requires that
(1− χ)Dw,t = χDi,t, (2.30)
while the aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + It + (1− χ)φ2 (Dw,t − D¯w)
2. (2.31)
A competitive rational expectations equilibrium is a stochastic set of sequences {Ct,
Ci,t, Cw,t, Di,t, Dw,t, It, Ii,t, Kt, Ki,t, Λi,t, Λw,t, Nt, Nw,t, Πt, Qt, Rt, Wt, Yt}∞t=0 satisfy-
ing the households’ and firms’ first-order conditions, as well as aggregation identities,
market clearing conditions, and no-Ponzi-game constraints, given the exogenous real-
izations of {ζt, µt, zt, νt}∞t=0. The model is solved by a log-linear approximation around
its deterministic steady state.
2.3 Calibration
2.3.1 Functional Forms
Investors’ preferences are given by
Ui(Ci, Di) =
C1−σi
1− σ , (2.32)
where σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The workers’
period utility is given by
Uw(Cw, Ci, Nw) =
C1−σw
1− σX
bσ − γN
1+η
w
1 + η , (2.33)
where b indicates the strength of the consumption externality, γ is a scaling parameter,
and η is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. This specification implies that
MRSt = γNηw,t/Λw,t.
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X is assumed to be the contemporaneous consumption level of investors relative
to the contemporaneous consumption level of workers, Xt = Ci,t/Cw,t. Adapting the
specification of Dupor and Liu (2003), we model b as a “jealousy” parameter (i.e. b ≥ 0),
implying that an increase in the investors’ consumption level leads to a decrease in the
workers’ utility level.7
Intermediate good firms produce according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt(i) = ztKt−1(i)αNt(i)1−α, (2.34)
where α ∈ [0, 1] measures the capital income share. This specification implies that
MPLt = (1− α)Yt/Nt and MPKt = αYt/Kt−1.
2.3.2 Parameterization
Table 2.2 shows the parameter values of the models’ baseline calibration, where an
upper bar denotes the steady state value of the respective variable. The simulated
data of the model are at a quarterly frequency. The depreciation rate of capital, δ,
equals 2.5%, which corresponds to an annual depreciation rate on capital equal to 10
percent. The discount factor of both agents is set to 0.995, which, combined with δ,
implies a real interest rate on capital of 3%.
Following the empirical study by Bertrand and Morse (2013), the share of investors
(rich households) in the overall population, χ, is set to 20%. We normalize the steady
state level of labor to 0.33 and set the inverse Frisch elasticity, η, to 1, which is in the
range of values suggested by Hall (2009). The capital share parameter, α, equals 0.27.
The steady state levels z¯ and ζ¯ are normalized to 1.
In equilibrium, marginal cost equals the inverse of the price markup. The steady
state values for the rental rate of capital and marginal costs are used to calculate the
steady state wage rate, which leads, subsequently, to the steady state level of capital.
After obtaining the levels of both input factors, we are able to calculate the steady
7Similar specifications of relative consumption motives are used by Alvarez-Cuadrado and El-Attar
(2012) and Al-Hussami and Remesal (2012) who study the effect of rising inequality on individual
saving rates and current account imbalances, respectively.
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Table 2.2: Model Calibration
Parameter Value
Preferences
Discount factors βi = βw 0.995
Inverse Frisch elasticity η 1
Fraction of investors χ 0.20
Technology
Capital share α 0.27
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Steady state
Price markup ν¯ 1.1
Wage markup µ¯ 1.1
Labor N¯ 0.33
Credit-to-labor income D¯w/(W¯ N¯w) 0.27
Neutral technology z¯ 1
Investment specific Technology ζ¯ 1
state output level. The resulting steady state investment-to-GDP ratio equals 17%,
which is in line with US data for our sample period.
Because the price markup is larger than unity, profits are positive in equilibrium.
We set µ¯ and ν¯ to 1.1 so that steady state markups in the product and labor market
are 10%, which is in the range of values typically used in the literature. By assuming
a steady state consumer credit-to-labor income ratio for workers, D¯w/(W¯ N¯w), of 27%,
which is the average for the Great Moderation, and using the two budget constraints,
we determine the consumption levels of both agents. The investors’ consumption level
is then used to obtain the respective shadow price of consumption λ¯i.
The workers’ shadow price of consumption depends on the parameter b, which mea-
sures the strength of the relative consumption motive in their utility function. In
what follows, we estimate b and other deep model parameters by SMM. Finally, after
obtaining b, the parameter γ is calibrated via the steady state labor supply condition.
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2.4 Model Estimation
We estimate the characteristics of the technology shock and the redistribution shock by
ordinary least squares (OLS). Due to data limitations, the remaining shock parameters
are estimated with a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) approach. Moreover, the
most crucial parameters for our model, namely σ and b, which determine the impact
of the relative consumption motive, are also included in this estimation procedure.
2.4.1 OLS Estimation
As observation period, we select the Great Moderation, ranging from 1982q1 to 2008q2.
With the exception of the technology shock series, all data series mentioned in the
following are obtained from the FRED database.
Data on the technology shock are taken from Fernald (2012). The variable is de-
trended before estimation by a one-sided HP-filter with a smoothing value of 1600 as
suggested by Born and Pfeifer (2014). The estimated AR-coefficient and standard de-
viation are 0.837 and 0.008 respectively. These estimates are similar to the findings of
Bullard and Singh (2012).
For constructing a time series of the redistribution shock, we follow Galí, Gertler,
and López-Salido (2007) and use the following equation,
µt = MPLt − wt, (2.35)
where the marginal product of labor,MPLt, equals log[(1−α)yt/nt]. yt/nt is measured
as the real output per hour worked of all persons in the nonfarm business sector, and wt
is the log of real compensation per hour in this sector. Again, all series are detrended by
the one-sided HP-filter. The estimates of the AR-coefficient and the standard deviation
are 0.777 and 0.006 respectively, and thus, similar to those of Galí, Gertler, and López-
Salido (2007) and Karabarbounis (2014). The upper part of Table 2.3 summarizes the
parameter values estimated by OLS.
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2.4.2 SMM Estimation
According to (2.25), the wage markup, νt, is defined as the product of the real wage
rate, Wt, and the marginal rate of substitution, MRSt. Given the specific utility
function of workers,
MRSt =
γNηw,t
Λw,t
, where Λw,t = C−σw,tXbσ, (2.36)
to calculate a wage markup series, we would need data on Ci,t and Cw,t, and an appro-
priate value for b, the parameter measuring the strength of the relative consumption
motive. However, since there is no such data available to the best of our knowledge and
there is little guidance in the literature about values for b, we use the SMM estimator,
originally proposed by McFadden (1989) and Lee and Ingram (1991), to overcome the
data problem. The objective of SMM is to find a parameter vector that minimizes the
weighted distance between simulated model moments and their empirical counterparts.
Let Ω̂ be a k × 1 vector of empirical moments computed from the data and let
Ω (θ) be the k × 1 vector of simulated moments computed from artificial data. The
corresponding time series are generated from simulating the model given a draw of
random shocks and the p× 1 vector θ ∈ Θ, with Θ ⊆ Rp. The length of the simulated
series is τT , where T is the number of observations in the real data set and τ ≥ 1 is
an integer. Then, the SMM estimator is given by
θ˜SMM = arg min
θ∈Θ
[
Ω̂− Ω (θ)
]′
W−1
[
Ω̂− Ω (θ)
]
, (2.37)
where W is a k × k positive-definite weighting matrix.
Specifically, Ω̂ contains the consumer credit moments as shown in Table 2.1. θ˜SMM
contains the estimates for b, σ, φ, ρζ,1, ρζ,2, σζ ρν , and σν . For the weighting matrix,
we follow Ruge-Murcia (2013) and choose a matrix with diagonal elements equal to the
optimal weighting matrix while all off-diagonal elements are equal to zero.8 Hence, we
8Ruge-Murcia (2013) shows that this choice produces consistent parameter estimates, while stan-
dard errors are just slightly higher than those generated with the optimal weighting matrix. The
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only put weight on moments that are observed in the data and force the estimation
to consider only economically meaningful moments (see Cochrane, 2005, chap. 11).
Additionally, we follow Born and Pfeifer (2014) and incorporate prior information about
the parameters to estimate. In particular, we choose prior means θ¯ for each parameter
in θ and expand [Ω̂ − Ω(θ)] by (θ˜SMM − θ), the deviation of the estimated parameter
from the respective prior mean. We expand W by attaching small penalty terms to
the diagonal, which raise the objective function when deviating from the prior mean.
We choose this procedure to rule out local minima in implausible regions of the state
space which is often the case when estimating DSGE models.9 We choose a prior mean
of 0 to be agnostic about the strength of the relative consumption motive b.
To rule out dependence on one particular draw of shocks, we draw several sets of
shocks and choose the parameter set that minimizes the average objective function.
We use the following algorithm to estimate θ.
Algorithm 2.1 (Construction of objective function to be minimized) We start
with a guess for θ˜SMM . Then:
1. Draw 50 sets of shocks, each consisting of (τT + 1500)× 4 values.
2. For each set of shocks: solve the model, simulate time series, discard the first
1500 periods, compute moments, compute objective function.
3. Take average over all 50 objective function values and minimize this.
For the minimization, we use the nonlinear optimization routine proposed by Byrd,
Nocedal, and Waltz (2006). All parameters are set as in the baseline calibration (see
Table 2.2), except for those of θ˜SMM . We set τ to 10, implying that the artificial time
series are ten times larger than the original sample size. Ruge-Murcia (2013) shows that
this is a useful choice for handling the trade-off between accuracy and computational
cost.
optimal weighting matrix is given by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix associated with the
sample moments.
9Also known as the “dilemma of absurd parameter estimates”, see An and Schorfheide (2007).
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Following Ruge-Murcia (2013), we compute the standard errors of θ˜SMM from an
estimate of its asymptotic covariance matrix as
(1 + 1/τ)(J ′WJ)−1J ′WJSJ(J ′WJ)−1, (2.38)
where J is the Jacobian matrix and S is the full variance-covariance matrix of the
empirical moments.
Table 2.3: Parameter Values for Model Simulation
Parameter Value SD
OLS estimation
AR(1)-coefficient technology shock ρz 0.8368 (0.0554)
Standard deviation technology shock σz 0.0084 (0.0031)
AR(1)-coefficient redistribution shock ρµ 0.7769 (0.0629)
Standard deviation redistribution shock σµ 0.0063 (0.0024)
Parameter Value SD
SMM estimation
Relative consumption motive b 6.5231 (0.2776)
Inverse substitution elasticity σ 1.5368 (0.0921)
Debt adjustment cost parameter φ 1.3178 (0.0104)
AR-coefficient investment-specific technology shock ρζ,1 0.9045 (0.3230)
AR-coefficient investment-specific technology shock ρζ,2 −0.0192 (0.3410)
Standard deviation investment shock σζ 0.0141 (0.0017)
AR-coefficient wage markup shock ρν 0.4671 (0.1203)
Standard deviation wage markup shock σν 0.0272 (0.0040)
The results of the SMM estimation are shown in the lower part of Table 2.3. For b,
we obtain a value of 6.523 which is estimated to be significantly different from zero,
indicating a strong presence of the relative consumption motive. To get a better in-
terpretation of this value, we directly relate this estimate to the findings of Bertrand
and Morse (2013). In doing so, we simulate an exogenous increase in the investors’
income stream and compare the implied investors’ consumption response to the re-
spective workers’ consumption change. A 1% increase in consumption by investors is
associated with 0.8% higher consumption expenditures by working households. This
elasticity is in the upper range of estimates provided by Bertrand and Morse (2013),
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Table 2.4: Data and Simulated Model Correlations
σxt/σDt ρ(xt, Dt) σxt/σYt ρ(xt, Yt)
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 0.4568 0.3615 0.1523 0.1272 - - - -
Consumption 0.2783 0.3034 0.1658 0.1970 0.6092 0.8395 0.8020 0.7529
Investment 1.7524 1.1733 0.0852 −0.0063 3.8359 3.2472 0.9061 0.7489
Hours worked 0.5080 0.5479 0.3603 0.3326 1.1120 1.5167 0.8144 0.7342
Real wage 0.3994 0.4541 −0.3207 −0.4386 0.8743 1.2576 0.0023 −0.2970
Note: Consumer credit has been deflated using the price index of personal consumption expenditures.
All variables are logged and HP-filtered (smoothing parameter of 1600) to obtain cyclical components.
For data definitions and sources see Appendix.
which implies that our estimated model is able to replicate microeconometric evidence
on the strength of the keeping up motive.
The values for σ, φ, ρζ,1 and ρζ,2 are in the range of values typically found in other
studies. The AR-coefficient for the wage markup shock displays a relatively low degree
of persistence with a value of 0.467. Moreover, the standard deviations of both shocks,
σζ and σν , are in line with values found by related studies.
Columns 2-5 of table 2.4 report the credit moments obtained from the data and from
the model simulation. All these model moments are close to those in the data with
only minor discrepancies. In line with the empirical observation, output, consumption,
hours worked, and the real wage are less volatile than consumer credit, whereas invest-
ment show a higher volatility. As in the data, the models’ responses imply positive
correlations between consumption, output, hours worked, and credit whereas the real
wage and consumer credit are negatively correlated. Additionally, investment show no
clear correlation with the credit cycle. The rather negligible differences suggest that
our calibration/estimation exercise provides a set of reasonable parameter values and,
furthermore, supports the inclusion of the keeping up with the Riches mechanism.
Columns 6-9 reveal the correlations between output and the remaining four measures.
Note that these coefficients were not included in the moment-matching approach. Thus,
we interpret these results as the model’s ability to replicate important conventional
business cycle relations.
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Simulating the model leads to a strong procyclical behavior of investment and hours
worked with coefficients close to the empirical moments. The model is also able to
produce a strong positive co-movement between output and consumption as observed
in the data. While the wage rate is completely acyclical in the data, the two series
are negatively correlated in the model simulation. However, the differences between
the two sets of moments are only small-sized so that we interpret the results of this
quantitative exercise as a validation of our proposed model and the underlying calibra-
tion/estimation strategy.
2.5 Impulse Responses
In Section 2.1, we have shown that for the period of the Great Moderation consumer
credit exhibits
a) positive correlations with consumption and output,
b) a positive correlation with hours worked,
c) a negative correlation with real wages.
In this section, we use our proposed model to study the effects of a neutral tech-
nology shock, a wage markup shock, a price markup shock, and an investment-specific
technology shock and assess their ability to reproduce these empirical relationships.
All parameter values are set according to Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.
As mentioned above, the two markup shocks are closely related to the labor wedge,
which is responsible for substantial unexplained cyclical fluctuations.10 By including
these shocks, we stress the importance of the labor wedge not only for labor market
outcomes but also for the behavior of consumer credit over the past three decades.
We present model responses for two different values for b, the estimated value bˆ and
b = 0, while holding all remaining parameter values constant, to highlight the impact
of the workers’ relative consumption motive.
10See Hall (1997), Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007),
Shimer (2009), Karabarbounis (2014).
53
2.5.1 Neutral Technology Shock
Figure 2.1 shows the effects of a positive neutral technology shock to the model econ-
omy. We first discuss the results for b = bˆ (solid lines). An increase in zt causes output
to go up immediately. As a result of the rise in productivity, the marginal products of
labor and capital increase, leading to a higher wage rate and interest rate on capital.
Both agents increase their respective consumption levels, although the rise is more pro-
nounced for working households. As bˆ > 0, workers minimize consumption differences
by reducing hours worked and credit demand substantially. However, workers’ total
labor income increases as the rise in the wage rate is more pronounced than the fall in
hours worked. Real profits increase by a similar magnitude as output.
If we abstract from the relative consumption motive, b = 0, the results (dash-dotted
lines) are quantitatively different but do not change qualitatively. For b = 0, profits
and, therefore, investors’ income and consumption increase by a larger amount com-
pared to the case of b = bˆ. Since workers now do not seek to minimize the difference
between both consumption levels, they also consume more than in the case of b = bˆ.
Consequently, workers reduce labor supply by a smaller amount and, in addition, re-
duce credit demand less strongly. As a result, workers’ labor income increases stronger.
Also, investment rises by a larger amount. Consequently, the rise in output to a neutral
technology shock is amplified when b = 0.
To summarize, irrespective of the inclusion of the relative consumption motive, the
neutral technology shock is able to reproduce the negative correlation between con-
sumer credit and wages and leads to a positive co-movement between credit and labor.
Nevertheless, the model generates a negative relation between consumer credit, con-
sumption, and output which is in contrast to the data.11
11Here and in the following, the mentioned correlations does solely correspond to the impact re-
sponses of the respective variables.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Responses to Neutral Technology Shock
b = b̂
b = 0
Note: Responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes measure
time in quarters.
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2.5.2 Wage Markup Shock
In Figure 2.2, the effects of a positive wage markup shock are presented. For b = bˆ
(solid lines), the shock leads to a boost in the wage rate, whereas the marginal product
of labor remains unchanged. Due to cost minimization, the demand for labor falls. This
reduction in labor demand is so strong that, although wages rise, workers’ labor income
declines. Consumption smoothing combined with the relative consumption motive
forces workers to demand a higher amount of credit. As the interest rate on capital
decreases, investment declines as well. Combined with the falling labor demand, output
decreases immediately, which leads to lower profits received by investors. Consequently,
investors reduce their consumption level by a small amount. Seeking to minimize
consumption differences, working households decrease their consumption expenditures
as well.
When b = 0, the results show only quantitative differences. The downturns in hours
worked, labor income and output are more severe when we abstract from consumption
externalities. Similarly, profits fall by a larger amount such that investors’ consumption
level decreases stronger. In addition, the reduction in workers’ consumption is larger
when the relative consumption motive is not present.
In contrast to the data, the model generates a positive correlation between consumer
credit and wages as a response to a wage markup shock and negative co-movements
between consumer credit, consumption and labor. These results do not depend on the
presence of the relative consumption motive in the workers’ utility function.
2.5.3 Price Markup Shock
Figure 2.3 presents the model responses to the price markup shock. The shock leads to
a falling wage rate, while not affecting the marginal product of labor. A similar effect
can be observed for the rental rate of capital. Due to lower marginal cost, profits rise
such that investors obtain a higher income and increase their consumption level. If the
relative consumption motive is present (b = bˆ, solid lines), which induces workers to
minimize consumption differences, working households respond to the rise in investors
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to Wage Markup Shock
b = b̂
b = 0
Note: Responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes measure
time in quarters.
57
consumption by, first, increasing their labor supply. As a result, the absolute drop
in labor income is smaller than the wage reduction. Second, workers enhance their
demand for credit to finance their desired level of consumption. Both effects induce an
increase in workers’ consumption expenditures. As investment and hours worked rise,
aggregate output also goes up when the price markup shock hits the economy.
The situation changes if we abstract from the relative consumption motive (b = 0),
so that the workers’ choice of consumption only depends on consumption smoothing.
In this case, workers increase their labor supply by a smaller amount. As a result,
the drop in labor income is more pronounced. Consequently, also output goes up by a
smaller amount. Although investors still consume more than in steady state, workers
reduce their consumption expenditures when abstracting from the relative consumption
motive.
If b = 0, a price markup shock produces a negative correlation between consumer
credit and wages and positive correlations between credit, labor and output, in line with
the empirical counterparts. However, the implied model correlation between credit
and consumption is negative which stands in contrast to the data. Nevertheless, if
the consumption externality is present, the model produces a positive relation between
credit and consumption. Thus, if b = bˆ the models’ responses to a price markup shock
are perfectly in line with the data.
2.5.4 Investment Specific Technology Shock
Figure 2.4 presents the model responses to the investment specific technology shock.
Given the underlying AR(2)-structure, the response of the investment specific technol-
ogy shock is more persistent than the respective shock responses described before. For
the case of b = bˆ, investors increase investment on impact as the shock makes these
expenditures more productive. However, in the following periods investment fall below
its steady state value. On the other hand, investing households reduce their consump-
tion level, a result often found in the standard represent agent framework (e.g. Fisher,
2006; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010). By internalizing the investors con-
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Responses to Price Markup Shock
b = b̂
b = 0
Note: Responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes measure
time in quarters.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Responses to Investment Specific Technology Shock
b = b̂
b = 0
Note: Responses are measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Horizontal axes measure
time in quarters.
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sumption decision, working households also decrease their consumption expenditures.
This results in a reduced supply of hours worked and a falling demand for credit.
The reduced labor supply induces an increase in the wage rate. As the fall in hours
worked is stronger than the increase in investment, aggregate output and profits fall
below their respective steady state values. Perfectly in line with the data, the models’
responses to the investment specific technology shock lead to a negative correlation
between credit and wages and positive co-movements between credit, hours worked,
consumption, and output. The negative responses of almost all aggregate variables
is supported by recent empirical evidence showing that investment-specific technology
shocks have contractionary effects (Basu, Fernald, and Kimball, 2013).
The results change significantly when the consumption externality is switched off (b =
0). Working households now increase their labor supply and reduce their credit demand
by a smaller amount, such that the reduction in their consumption expenditures is only
marginally. Similarly, investors’ consumption level drops less pronounced, also due to
an increase in profits. Consequently, the rise in investment is more persistent and as
both input factors increase also output goes up when the relative consumption motive
is absent.
When we abstract form the consumption externality, the investment specific tech-
nology shock produces, in line with the data, a negative (positive) correlation between
credit and wages (consumption) but negative co-movements between credit, output
and hours worked which is in contrast to the empirical counterparts.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have set up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that mim-
ics the short-run dynamics of consumer credit for the period of the Great Moderation.
The model consists of two different household types. Investors, who hold the economy’s
entire capital stock, own the firms and supply credit, and workers who make up the
entire labor force and demand credit to finance their desired level of consumption. In
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addition, we incorporate a keeping up with the Riches mechanism so that workers seek
to minimize the difference between investors’ and their own consumption level.
When estimating deep model parameter, we find a positive significant value for the
workers’ keeping-up parameter. Qualitatively, an income redistribution from labor to
capital and an investment specific technology shock lead to model dynamics that are
perfectly in line with the empirical evidence. More precisely, both shocks generate pos-
itive correlations of consumer credit with output, consumption, and labor, while there
is a negative co-movement between consumer credit and the real wage. In contrast,
a technology shock and a wage markup shock are not able to generate the positive
correlations between consumer credit, output, and consumption. Complementary to
micro evidence (Bertrand and Morse, 2013), we have provided macro-evidence on the
link between income inequality, consumption externalities, and credit dynamics.
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2.A Appendix
Table A2.1: Data Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source Series ID (FRED database)
Consumer credit Level of consumer credit
held by households and
nonprofit organizations
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
HCCSDODNS
Output Real output in the non-
farm business sector
U.S. Department of La-
bor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics
OUTNFB
Hours worked Hours of all persons in the
nonfarm business sector
U.S. Department of La-
bor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics
HOANBS
Real wage Real compensation per
hour in the nonfarm busi-
ness sector
U.S. Department of La-
bor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics
COMPRNFB
Labor productivity Real output per hour of
all persons in the nonfarm
business sector
U.S. Department of La-
bor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics
OPHNFB
Consumption Real personal consump-
tion expenditures
U.S. Department of Com-
merce: Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis
PCECC96
Investment Real gross private domes-
tic investment
U.S. Department of Com-
merce: Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis
GPDIC96
Capital Net real capital stock of
the total economy at 2005
prices (linear interpola-
tion of annual values)
AMECO database of the
European Commission
Prices Chain-type price index of
personal consumption ex-
penditures
U.S. Department of Com-
merce: Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis
PCECTPI
Total factor productivity Solow residual-based
measure of technology
corrected for labor and
capital utilization, non-
constant returns to scale
and imperfect competition
Fernald (2012)
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3 Austerity and Private Debt12
Abstract
This study provides empirical evidence that the costs of austerity crucially depend on
the level of private indebtedness. In particular, fiscal consolidations lead to severe con-
tractions when implemented in high private debt states. Contrary, fiscal consolidations
have no significant effect on economic activity when private debt is low. These results
are robust for alternative definitions of private debt overhang, the composition of fis-
cal consolidations, and controlling for the state of the business cycle and government
debt overhang. I show that deterioration in household balance sheets is important to
understand private debt-dependent effects of austerity.
Keywords: Fiscal consolidation, Private debt, Local Projection.
JEL Codes: C23, E32, E62.
3.1 Introduction
This study shows that the effects of fiscal consolidations crucially depend on the level
of private indebtedness. More specifically, I find that austerity leads to severe contrac-
tions in periods of private debt overhang.13 In contrast, fiscal consolidations have no
significant impact on economic activity when private debt is low.
The paper contributes to the literature as it tests for the validity of existing theo-
retical models which show that private indebtedness matters for the transmission of
fiscal policy (for example Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri, 2015; Eggertsson and Krugman,
2012; Kaplan and Violante, 2014). In fact, I provide extensive empirical evidence
that confirms predictions of theories pointing out the impact of fiscal policy interven-
tions to be larger in periods of private debt overhang. My results help understanding
12A shortened version of this chapter is resubmitted to the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
13Private debt overhang describes periods when private debt-to-GDP ratios are above trend.
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the dismal growth performances in southern European countries, which implemented
large-scale fiscal consolidation programs while confronted with high private debt lev-
els. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study investigating private
debt-dependent effects of fiscal consolidations.
Recent contributions have pointed to the important role of private debt for the prop-
agation and amplification of shocks and policy interventions. In their influential work,
Mian and Sufi (2011, 2012) show that those US counties which experienced the largest
increase in housing leverage before the financial crisis, suffered from more pronounced
economic slack in the postcrisis period. The authors present evidence that deterioration
in household balance sheets can explain the large drop in private demand and employ-
ment. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2016b) find that more mortgage-intensive credit
expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries, while this
effect is not present for non-mortgage credit booms. Moreover, Jordà, Schularick, and
Taylor (2016a) empirically investigate the linkage between private borrowing, public
debt burdens, and financial instability and find that private credit booms, not exces-
sive public borrowing or the level of public debt, are the main predictors of financial
turmoil.
Concerning the interrelation between fiscal policy and private debt, Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012), Kaplan and Violante (2014) and Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri (2015)
demonstrate in theoretical models that the government spending multiplier increases
with the level of private indebtedness. Within these models a significant share of house-
holds does not maximize lifetime utility due to borrowing constraints. Additionally,
borrowing constrained households are characterized by a higher marginal propensity
to consume out of income. Combined with price stickiness, Keynesian-type multipliers
emerge if the share of these agents is large enough, which in turn depends on the level
of private indebtedness.
Another strand of literature investigates state-dependent costs of fiscal consolidations
(Born, Müller, and Pfeifer, 2015; Jordà and Taylor, 2016). None of these studies,
however, allows the effects to differ according to the private debt level in the economy.
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This seems surprising given the above mentioned evidence which suggests that the
responses to economic innovations are amplified by private debt overhang. Against this
background, I provide empirical evidence that the economic consequences of austerity
are significantly affected by the level of private indebtedness.
To investigate the effects of fiscal consolidations depending on the state of the econ-
omy, I estimate state-dependent impulse responses to exogenous changes in the govern-
ment budget deficit using local projections as invented by Jordà (2005). The advantages
compared to vector autoregressions (VARs) are that local projections are more robust
to model misspecification and offer a very convenient way to account for state depen-
dence.14 Within the estimation approach, the state of the economy is allowed to vary
according to the level of private debt overhang. High debt and low debt states are iden-
tified as periods when private debt-to-GDP ratios were respectively above and below
trend. To identify fiscal consolidation periods, I use the narrative measure as proposed
by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014). The baseline dataset of my analysis covers
12 OECD countries at an annual frequency for the period 1978-2008.
The estimation results show that the responses to fiscal consolidations significantly
differ according to the level of private indebtedness. Specifically, the results reveal a
significant and severe decline in private consumption and GDP in high debt states.
Contrary, in low debt states, private consumption and GDP show a marginal and
insignificant reduction. A one percent of GDP fiscal consolidation translates into a
2 percent lower GDP after five years when implemented in a period of private debt
overhang. The drop in private consumption is even larger, resulting in a cumulative
decline of more than 3 percent. The respective values for fiscal consolidations in low
private debt states are 0.7 percent for GDP and 1.1 percent for consumption.
Concerning other important variables, I find that imports and the employment rate
significantly decrease in high private debt states, whereas these series do not show
any significant effect when private leverage is low. Monetary policy reacts to fiscal
consolidations by reducing the real interest rate by a similar magnitude irrespective
14A more detailed discussion of advantages and disadvantages of the local projection method is
given in the next section.
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of the private debt state. Interestingly, the sovereign default risk and the government
debt-to-GDP ratio increase significantly after consolidations implemented in a high
private debt environment. This finding contradicts to the usual intention of auster-
ity programs which lies in reducing the risk of sovereign default and/or reducing the
government debt burden.15
My findings are robust for alternative definitions of debt overhang, different ways
of identifying exogenous fiscal consolidation periods, and the composition of austerity
programs. Moreover, I show that my baseline results prevail when extending the Gua-
jardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) narrative measure for the years 2010-2014. Thus,
debt-dependent costs of fiscal consolidations are still present when explicitly taking
into account the large-scale austerity programs implemented after the Global Finan-
cial Crises. In addition, the results prove to be robust when I condition on the state
of the business cycle and government debt overhang.
Allowing the state of the business cycle to differ, I find that fiscal consolidations
implemented in periods of high private debt induce economic activity to fall in reces-
sions but also in booms. In expansions and recessions, austerity has no significant
effect on the economy when private debt is below average. Similar results emerge when
controlling for the government debt level. Independent of the government debt level,
consolidations induce significant declines in economic activity when private leverage is
high. In contrast, consolidations in low private debt states show insignificant effects
irrespective of the public debt burden. To sum up, my findings suggest that the costs
of austerity are mainly determined by the private debt level in the economy whereas
the state of the business cycle and the level of public debt play only a minor role for
the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
I highlight two additional results detecting changes in household balance sheets as a
possible transmission channel through which my findings can be rationalized. First, by
differentiating between household and corporate debt, I show that most of the results
are driven by household leverage. While consolidations lead to a significant drop in
15Complementarily, Born, Müller, and Pfeifer (2015) show that austerity leads to an increase in
the sovereign default premium in times of fiscal stress.
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GDP when households are highly indebted, GDP does not react significantly when
corporate debt is above average. Therefore, private debt-dependent effects of fiscal
policy seem to be caused by households’ and not firms’ borrowing decisions. Second,
house prices significantly decline when fiscal consolidations are implemented in high
private debt states, whereas they basically do not show any effect in low private debt
states. Falling house prices typically reduce the value of home equity households can
use as collateral to borrow against.16
The closest related work to this study is the paper by Bernardini and Peersman
(2015). They find that the government spending multiplier is considerably larger in
periods of private debt overhang. However, my paper departs from their study in two
important dimensions. First, while Bernardini and Peersman (2015) focus on non-
linear effects of government spending, I estimate private debt-dependent responses to
fiscal consolidations which are a combination of tax-based and spending-based adjust-
ments. It seems reasonable to assume that the effects of austerity measures differ from
standard fiscal spending shocks, because fiscal consolidations are typically implemented
under special circumstances or because they are particularly large (Born, Müller, and
Pfeifer, 2015). Moreover, it is unclear whether the effects of equally-sized expansion
and tightening of fiscal policy should be symmetric, especially in the face of borrowing
constraints. This argument is supported by recent empirical evidence showing that the
government spending multiplier significantly differs between fiscal consolidations and
fiscal expansions (Barnichon and Matthes, 2015; Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin,
2015). In addition, I make use of the narrative consolidation measure to detect ex-
ogenous changes in fiscal policy. Second, my analysis is based on a panel dataset,
whereas Bernardini and Peersman (2015) focus on the US economy. Thus, I provide
multi-country evidence for private debt-dependent responses to fiscal policy.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the econometric
method, database, and the identification of private debt states is described. Section 3
16As shown by Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013), highly leveraged households have a higher marginal
propensity to consume out of housing wealth such that, ceteris paribus, the aggregate drop in private
demand to falling house prices increases with the level of private debt overhang in the economy.
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presents results of the benchmark estimation. In addition, it is shown that my results
are robust to an alternative identification approach, different ways of separating trend
from cycle in private leverage, and when extending the narrative consolidation measure
past 2009. In Section 4, I check whether the results depend on the composition of
the fiscal consolidation. Moreover, I detect state-dependent effects of other relevant
variables. In Section 5, I further control for two prominent state variables: the business
cycle and government debt overhang. Section 6 presents evidence that indicates the
importance of the household balance sheet for understanding private debt-dependent
effects of fiscal consolidations. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Econometric Method
To investigate the effects of fiscal consolidations depending on the state of the econ-
omy, I follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), Ramey and Zubairy (2014) and
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) in estimating state-dependent impulse responses
to exogenous innovations in the government budget deficit using local projections as
invented by Jordà (2005). Recently, this method has become a very popular tool to
estimate non-linear effects. The main advantages compared to VARs are that local
projections are more robust to model misspecifications and do not impose the implicit
dynamic restrictions involved in VARs. Moreover, local projections offer a very con-
venient way to account for state dependence. However, the Jordà method does not
uniformly dominate the standard VAR approach for calculating impulse responses. In
particular, because it does not impose any restrictions that link the impulse responses
across different horizons, the estimates are often eratic because of the loss of efficiency.
Moreover, it sometimes display oscillations at longer horizons. For a more detailed
discussion, I refer to Ramey and Zubairy (2014).
Let Yi,t+h − Yi,t−1 denote the cumulative response of a particular variable of interest
from time t − 1 to t + h to an exogenous change in the government budget deficit at
time t, where i indexes the countries in my sample. I estimate a set of regressions
of Yi,t+h − Yi,t−1 on shocks to the government budget deficit Di,t measured by the
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narrative series as proposed by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) and a set of
control variables Xi,t:
Yi,t+h − Yi,t−1 = Ii,t−1 [ψA,h(L)Xi,t−1 + βA,hDi,t]
+ (1− Ii,t−1) [ψB,h(L)Xi,t−1 + βB,hDi,t] + αi,h + ηt,h + i,t+h.
(3.1)
Here, αi,h are country-specific constants and ηt,h captures time fixed effects to control
for common macro shocks. i,t denotes the error term which is assumed to have a zero
mean and strictly positive variance. The dummy variable Ii,t captures the state {A,B}
of the economy. Ii,t takes the value of one when private debt is above a certain threshold
and zero when it is below that threshold. Following the literature on state-dependent
effects of fiscal policy (see for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Ramey
and Zubairy, 2014), I include a one-period lag of Ii,t in the estimation to minimize
the contemporaneous correlation between the shock series and changes in the indicator
variable. L represents the lag operator. The collection of βA,h and βB,h coefficients
directly provide the state-dependent responses of variable Yi,t+h−Yi,t−1 at time t+h to
the shock at time t. Given my specification, βA,h indicates the response of Yi,t+h−Yi,t−1
to the consolidation shock in high private debt states, whereas βB,h shows the effect in
low private debt states.
In the following, all variables of interest are expressed in level log or level units.
This stands in contrast to the approach used in Barro and Redlick (2011), Owyang,
Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) where the responses are
scaled by GDP. However, given the facts that I use a much shorter sample compared
to the aforementioned studies and that the consolidation shock Di,t is already scaled
by GDP, it does not seem necessary to normalize the impulse responses by a measure
of economic activity.
I prefer the specification of equation (3.1) to the propensity score matching method
used in Jordà and Taylor (2016) because the former approach retains information
about the size of fiscal consolidations, whereas the latter only allows the partition
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of fiscal consolidations into a binary dummy variable 0/1 indicating periods of fiscal
consolidation and periods of no consolidation. By retaining information about the
magnitude of fiscal consolidations, I am able to directly measure the size of fiscal
consolidation across different private debt states. Indeed, in Section 3.2.1, I show that
my results are robust when controlling for anticipation effects in the narrative measure.
The dataset of my analysis is of annual frequency over the period 1978-2008 for a
balanced sample of 12 OECD countries.17 The sample size of the panel is limited by the
availability of the credit data used. In my baseline specification, the control variables
included in Xi,t are the absolute changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance
relative to GDP (CAPB), the log difference of real GDP and the log difference of real
personal consumption expenditures.18 This choice closely mimics the VAR specification
used in Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014). L = 1 in all estimations, although the
results are robust to varying the lag length.
To identify fiscal consolidation shocks, Di,t, I use the narrative measure as proposed
by Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014). This measure is constructed by examining
contemporaneous policy documents. The main advantage of identifying fiscal consol-
idations via the narrative measure compared to changes in the CAPB as suggested
by Alesina and Ardagna (2010), is that the narrative measure is exogenous to current
economic developments while changes in the CAPB are correlated to the business cy-
cle. Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) show that there is a significant positive
correlation between GDP forecast revisions and changes in the CAPB, whereas the
null-hypothesis of no correlation between forecast revisions and the narrative measure
cannot be rejected.
The definition of episodes of private debt overhang follows closely the approach by
Bernardini and Peersman (2015). As an indicator for private debt, I use the private
debt-to-GDP ratio, where data are taken from Schularick and Taylor (2012). Although
17The included countries are Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, United King-
dom, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. All data definitions and sources
can be found in the appendix.
18The results are not affected when using CAPB in levels as control variable in the regressions.
The appendix includes estimation results when controlling for CAPB instead of changes in the deficit
variable.
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the narrative consolidation measure is available for the period 1978-2009, Schularick
and Taylor (2012) provide private debt data that just cover the years 1978-2008. To
differentiate between high-debt and low-debt states, the debt-to-GDP ratios are fil-
tered by country-specific smooth Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trends, where the smoothing
parameter, λ, is set to 10, 000. The relatively high smoothing parameter ensures that
the filter removes even the lowest frequency variations in the private debt-to-GDP se-
ries. Indeed, the implementation of the Third Basel Accord (Basel III) involves the use
of a similar credit gap indicator as used in my analysis (BIS, 2010). As shown by Borio
(2014) and Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012), the credit cycle is significantly
longer and has a much greater amplitude than the standard business cycle. Therefore,
Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2011) propose the use of an extremely smooth
HP-trend to capture the low frequency of financial cycles. Given these considerations,
applying an HP-filter with a smoothing parameter λ = 10.000 to construct the trending
and cyclical component of private leverage seems appropriate for my analysis. High
private debt states are defined as periods with positive deviations of the debt-to-GDP
ratios from the trends, whereas low private debt states indicate periods when debt-to-
GDP ratios were below its long-run trends. This procedure implies that out of the 372
periods included in the sample, 215 or 58% are detected as low private debt periods,
while the remaining 157 episodes or 42% indicate periods of private debt overhang. In
a separate exercise it is shown that the results are robust to two alternative definitions
of high/low private debt states.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Baseline
The main variables of interest, Yi,t+h−Yi,t−1, are the cumulative change in the log of real
GDP and the cumulative change in the log of real personal consumption expenditures.
Therefore, βA,h and βB,h directly estimate the state-dependent cumulative percentage
change in the variables of interest in response to a fiscal consolidation shock.
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Figure 3.1 presents the results of my baseline specification. It shows the cumulative
effects on GDP and private consumption (solid lines) from year 0 to year 4 in response
to a fiscal consolidation shock, where 0 indicates the year in which the shock occurs.
Shaded areas indicate 90% confidence bands based on robust standard errors clustered
by country. The respective responses are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of
GDP in year 0. The left column shows the cumulative responses to a fiscal consolidation
implemented in a high private debt state, while the second column shows the respective
changes to a fiscal consolidation undertaken in a low private debt state.
When private debt is below average, GDP shows a mild and insignificant reduction
which accumulates to less than 1% four years after the fiscal consolidation was im-
plemented. Contrary, fiscal consolidations undertaken when private leverage is high
lead to a significant decline in GDP which accumulates to almost 2% at the end of the
forecast horizon. A similar pattern can be observed for the respective consumption
responses. Private consumption expenditures do not show a significant change in a
low debt state. However, in a high private debt state consumption falls significantly
such that expenditures are 3% lower after five years. The results indicate that a fiscal
consolidation implemented when private debt is low leads to a small but insignificant
reduction in economic activity, while fiscal consolidations in high private debt states
induce a severe contraction in the economy.
Similar long-lasting, but non-permanent, negative effects of fiscal consolidations are
found by Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014), and
Jordà and Taylor (2016). When estimating my baseline local projections for a longer
horizon, all variables show a clear tendency to converge back to steady state values
seven years after the fiscal consolidation was implemented. To rule out any instability
concerns, I also estimated the model while including country-specific linear time trends.
It turns out that the baseline results are not affected when controlling for a possible
trending behavior in the endogenous variables. The results of both exercises can be
found in the appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Baseline Results
Note: The first two columns report cumulative changes (in per cent) in response to a shock of 1%
of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 years. The shaded areas
indicate 90% confidence bands based on robust standard errors clustered by country. The last column
shows the estimated difference between high debt and low debt responses. Dots indicate statistically
significant differences at the 90% level.
The right column of Figure 3.1 shows the respective differences βA,h− βB,h for GDP
and consumption at each period of the forecast horizon. Thus, a negative value indi-
cates that the response in high debt states is lower than in low private debt states.
The dots indicate statistical significance at the 90% level.
The response differences in GDP and private consumption are statistically significant
for most of the periods. For GDP the differences are significant for 3 out of the 5 years,
while they are significant for all 5 periods when inspecting the changes in private
consumption. Complementarily to the fist two columns of Figure 3.1, the latter findings
indicate that the negative effects of austerity are significantly larger when the policy
is implemented in a period of private debt overhang.19
As mentioned before, the Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) narrative consoli-
dation measure covers the period 1978-2009. However, because the private debt data
taken from Schularick and Taylor (2012) are just available for the period 1978-2008,
19The results are robust to changes in the sample. In the appendix it is shown that the estimates
prevail when leaving out the years of the Global Financial Crises. In addition, it presents results
indicating that my findings are not driven by any key country in the sample.
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the baseline sample includes the years 1978-2008. Nevertheless, I am confident that
the finding of private debt-dependent effects of fiscal consolidations is not affected by
leaving out the year 2009 for three reasons. First, for the sample used the narrative
measure does not identify any exogenous fiscal consolidation shock for the year 2009.
Therefore, I do not expect the point estimates of my local projections to change sig-
nificantly when adding observations of the final year 2009 to the sample. Second, I
reestimate my baseline regressions using total credit data from the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS). Contrary to the Schularick/Taylor series, they provide credit
data for the year 2009. However, for my sample of interest the BIS-credit data only
go back to 1980 so that I loose 12 observations compared to the (baseline) 1978-2008
sample. In the appendix it is shown that my findings prevail when using the BIS-credit
data. Finally, as Section 3.3.2 shows, the result of private debt-dependent costs of fiscal
consolidation is still present when using an extended version of the narrative measures
such that the panel covers the years 1980-2014.
3.3.2 Robustness
Alternative Identification: Jordà and Taylor (2016) question the exogeneity of the
narrative measure. They show that the Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) series
has a predictable component. Therefore, my estimates could be biased when using the
narrative measure as indicator for exogenous consolidation shocks.
To take account of possible anticipation effects, I combine the approach suggested by
Jordà and Taylor (2016) with the forecast error-approach proposed by Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012).20 The procedure consists of two steps. First, I regress the nar-
rative consolidation measure, Di,t, on a set of control variables which possibly include
information that help predict the outcome variable. The residuals of this regression
measure the unpredictable component of fiscal consolidations. In a second step, the
residuals are used as proxy for exogenous austerity innovations in the estimation of
equation (3.1).
20Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) use the unpredictable component of government spending
as proxy for exogenous variations in fiscal expenditures.
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Table 3.1: Alternative Identification of Fiscal Shock (effect in year t = 1)
GDP Consumption
Identification High Debt Low Debt Difference High Debt Low Debt Difference
Baseline −1.13∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.92∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −0.44 −1.28∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46)
Unpredictable −2.14∗∗∗ 0.05 −2.19∗∗∗ −3.06∗∗∗ −0.09 −2.97∗∗∗
component of Dit (1.06) (0.35) (0.79) (0.53)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
Motivated by the set of regressors chosen by Jordà and Taylor (2016), the vector of
control variables in the first stage regression includes country and time fixed effects and
a set of lagged macro variables (real GDP growth, real private consumption growth,
change in government debt-to-GDP ratio, change in policy rate, CPI-inflation).
Table 3.1 presents the results when using the unpredictable component of Di,t as
exogenous innovation and compares them to the benchmark estimation.21 As it turns
out, my findings are robust to this alternative identification strategy. For both iden-
tification approaches, fiscal consolidations induce severe and significant reductions in
GDP and private consumption when private debt is high, whereas in low private debt
states both variables do not respond significantly. For both identifications, the GDP
(consumption) response is estimated to be significantly lower when private leverage is
high compared to low private leverage periods. This exercise shows that the finding
of private debt-dependent effects of fiscal consolidation is robust to alternative ways of
identifying fiscal consolidation episodes.
Alternative Debt States Definition: One possible concern with my baseline esti-
mation could be that the results depend on the underlying definition of low and high
private debt states. For this reason, I make use of two alternative ways to differentiate
21Following Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014), all tables in the paper present the effects
obtained two years after the fiscal consolidation was implemented (here, when t = 1). Moreover, the
tables report whether the respective responses are statistically significant at the 5%, 10% and 16%
level. The 16% level is chosen as lower threshold because of the relatively small sample size of the panel
and because 16-84% confidence bands are widely used in the empirical macro literature (for example
Bjørnland and Leitemo, 2009; Castelnuovo and Surico, 2010; Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub, 2012).
For a general discussion on error bands for impulse responses see Sims and Zha (1999).
76
Table 3.2: Alternative Debt States Definition (effect in year t = 1)
Definition GDP Consumption
based on High Debt Low Debt Difference High Debt Low Debt Difference
HP-filter (Baseline) −1.13∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.92∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −0.44 −1.28∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46)
15-year MA −0.64∗∗∗ 0.49 −1.14∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗ −0.75 −0.62∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.71) (0.31) (0.67)
Deviation −0.84∗∗ −0.31 −0.52∗ −1.40∗∗∗ −0.59 −0.80∗∗∗
from mean (0.47) (0.35) (0.42) (0.43)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
between high and low private debt periods. On the one hand, I calculate high (low) pri-
vate debt episodes as periods in which the private debt-to-GDP ratio is above (below)
its 15-year moving average. 15 years corresponds to the median length of financial
cycles in industrialized countries (Borio, 2014). On the other hand, I follow Jordà,
Schularick, and Taylor (2014) and define private debt states based on deviations from
country-specific private leverage means. Whenever the change in the private debt-to-
GDP ratio is above (below) its country-specific mean for two consecutive years, I define
these episodes as high (low) private debt states.
As Table 3.2 shows, independent of the underlying debt state definition, I find strong
evidence for private debt-dependent effects of fiscal consolidations. More precisely,
GDP and private consumption decline significantly when private debt is high, whereas
there is no significant response when private debt is low. Moreover, for all definitions,
the respective GDP (consumption) response is estimated to be significantly lower when
private debt is high compared to the corresponding low private debt one.
This exercise reveals that my findings do not rely on the specific way used to define
low and high private debt states. The result of private debt-dependent costs of fiscal
consolidations is robust to different definitions of private debt overhang. However,
given the limited loss of observations compared to the other two definitions and its
actual relevance in financial market policy (Basel III), in what follows I use the smooth
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Figure 3.2: Extended Narrative Measure
Note: The first two columns report cumulative changes (in per cent) in response to a shock of 1%
of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 years. The shaded areas
indicate 90% confidence bands based on robust standard errors clustered by country. The last column
shows the estimated difference between high debt and low debt responses. Dots indicate statistically
significant differences at the 90% level.
HP-filter approach as the baseline method to separate trend from cyclical components
in private leverage.
Extending the Narrative Measure: The baseline dataset covers the period 1978-
2008, so it does not include the large-scale consolidation programs implemented by
several countries in response to the significant increase in public debt levels following
the deep economic downturn after the Global Financial Crises. To test whether my
result of private debt-dependent effects of fiscal consolidations prevails when taking
these austerity measures into account, I extend the Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori
(2014) narrative series for the years 2010-2014.
In extending the dataset, I follow closely Dell’ Erba, Mattina, and Roitman (2015)
and Agca and Igan (2013) who construct a series of the consolidation measure for the
years 2010 and 2011. The extension of the dataset is based on the following three
OECD reports: Restoring Public Finances, 2011, Restoring Public Finances, 2012
Update, and The State of Public Finances, 2015. These reports outline the economic
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situation, fiscal consolidation strategy and major consolidation measures for each of the
OECD member countries. The country notes in each report lay out each government’s
rationale for pursuing fiscal adjustment and are used to identify consolidation periods
that were motivated by a desire for deficit reduction. Table 2 of the appendix lists the
identified consolidation periods for the years 2010-2014.22
As the Schularick and Taylor (2012) loans series is just available until 2008, I make
use of private credit data published by the Bank for International Settlements. To
obtain private debt-to-GDP series, I divide the credit series by nominal GDP. Due to
limited availability of the BIS credit data, the sample is now restricted to the period
1980-2014. As before, low/high private debt states are defined as deviations from a
smooth HP-trend (λ = 10.000).
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse responses when using the extended narrative consolida-
tion measure. Totally in line with the benchmark result, GDP and private consumption
decrease significantly when private debt is high with slightly larger accumulated reduc-
tions compared to the baseline case. Contrary, GDP and private consumption do not
respond significantly when private debt is below average. Additionally, the respective
high debt responses are estimated to be significantly lower than the respective low debt
ones for almost all periods. Thus, debt-dependent costs of fiscal consolidations are still
present when explicitly taking into account the large-scale austerity programs imple-
mented after the Global Financial Crises. Indeed, the results indicate that high private
debt levels have amplified the negative effects of fiscal consolidations undertaken in the
period 2010-2014.
22I use the extension of the narrative measure as an additional robustness check and not as bench-
mark sample for two reasons. First, whereas the Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) measure is
constructed by examining contemporaneous policy documents of various sources (IMF Reports, OECD
Economic Surveys, Central Bank Reports, etc.), I rely mainly on the three OECD reports mentioned
above. Second, it can be questioned to what extent the consolidations implemented between 2010 and
2014 can be treated as fully exogenous. Given the severity of the recession, the austerity programs
undertaken in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crises could be related to the business cycle.
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3.4 Extensions
In this section, I test whether the result of debt-dependent costs of austerity vary with
the composition of the consolidation measure. Additionally, I show that the responses
of other important macro variables also depend crucially on the private debt level when
the consolidation is implemented.
3.4.1 Spending and Tax Based Consolidations
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) and Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2015) find
that the costs of austerity differ with the composition of fiscal consolidations. Both
studies show that tax-based consolidations lead to more severe contractions than spending-
based adjustments. To allow the effects of consolidations to vary with its composition,
I reestimate equation (3.1), where I make use of the composition definition stated by
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014). The authors define fiscal policy changes as
tax-based and spending-based if the budgetary impact of tax hikes and spending cuts,
respectively, is greater than half the total impact.
Table 3.3 shows the estimates for spending-based and tax-based consolidations.
Overall, the results coincide with the baseline estimation. Independent of the com-
position of the fiscal consolidation, GDP and private consumption do not change sig-
nificantly when the austerity measure is implemented in a low private debt state. In
contrast, GDP and private consumption are depressed significantly by tax-based and
spending-based consolidations when private debt is high. In line with Alesina, Favero,
and Giavazzi (2015) and Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014), I find that tax-based
consolidations have stronger effects on economic activity than spending-based adjust-
ments. Nevertheless, my result of private debt-dependent costs of austerity is robust
for the composition of fiscal consolidations.
3.4.2 Other Variables of Interest
So far, I have considered the private debt-depended responses of GDP and consumption
to fiscal consolidations. However, it seems worth studying whether other important
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Table 3.3: Spending Based vs. Tax Based (effect in year t = 1)
GDP Consumption
Composition High Debt Low Debt High Debt Low Debt
Spending-based −0.72∗∗ −0.21 −1.38∗∗∗ −0.32
(0.43) (0.26) (0.25) (0.39)
Tax-based −5.20∗∗∗ −0.59 −4.85∗∗∗ −1.37
(1.82) (0.78) (1.32) (1.07)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
macro variables also react differently to fiscal consolidations in high and low private
debt periods. In the following, I check for divergent responses in other components of
GDP: private investment, imports, and exports. Moreover, I test whether the effects
on the labor market, measured through the employment rate, differ as well. It is shown
that the central bank reduces its main policy rate by a similar magnitude, irrespective
of the private debt state. Finally, I study how the sovereign default risk, indicated by
the institutional investor ratings index (IIR) and the government debt-to-GDP ratio
response to consolidations in both private debt states. At each horizon, I project these
variables on fiscal consolidations and include their respective lags in the control vector
Xi,t. While investment, imports, and exports enter the estimation in log differences,
the employment rate, interest rate, IIR, and the government debt-to-GDP ratio are
considered in absolute changes.
Figure 3.3 presents the responses of investment, imports, and exports. Private in-
vestment increases slightly when the consolidation is undertaken in a period of low
private debt. However, this increase is not statistically significant. In high private
debt states, investment decreases significantly by more than 2% in the first two years.
Afterwards, the effect becomes insignificant as well. The mostly insignificant invest-
ment response relates to the empirical evidence presented by Mian, Sufi, and Verner
(2015). They show that rises in household debt are closely tied to consumption and
less related to business investment. Additionally, it can be interpreted as a first indica-
tor that households’, not firms’, borrowing decisions are mainly responsible for private
debt-dependent effects of austerity. However, below I will elaborate in more detail
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on the household balance sheet as a possible transmission channel to rationalize my
findings.
Divergent responses can also be observed for imports. Imports decrease slightly but
insignificantly in low private debt states. In contrast, imports are more than 5% lower
after 5 years when the consolidation is undertaken in a high private debt period. The
difference in the respective import responses is significant for all periods.
In both debt states exports increase substantially. However, the respective responses
are not statistically different from zero for most of the periods. As exports react
rather similar in low and high debt states, the response difference is not statistically
significant.23
Figure 3.4 shows the results for the employment rate, interest rate, IIR, and gov-
ernment debt. The employment rate increases steadily when private debt is below
average. Consolidations in high private debt states lead to a significant decline in the
employment rate. The accumulated loss after four years is 1.5 percentage points. Ad-
ditionally, as the right column shows, the employment rate response in high private
debt states is significantly lower than the respective one in low private debt states.
These findings indicate that the severe real costs of fiscal consolidations implemented
when private debt is high also translate into a deterioration in the labor market. This
relation is also captured by the theoretical set-up by Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri (2015).
In their model, the improvement in the labor market to a government spending shock
depends positively on the equilibrium level of household debt.
Private debt-dependent responses to fiscal consolidations could be explained by a
different reaction of the monetary authority to austerity in low and high debt states.
When the central bank reduces (increases) its interest rate by less (more) when austerity
is realized in a high leverage period compared to a low debt state, then the more
severe downtown could be caused by a debt-dependent interest rate change. Indeed,
as the second row of Figure 3.4 demonstrates, this hypothesis is not supported by the
23Taking the effects on imports and exports together, in an additional exercise, I found that the
current account significantly increases in high private debt states, while it stays almost unchanged
when private debt is low.
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Figure 3.3: Investment, Imports, Exports
Note: The first two columns report cumulative changes (in per cent) in response to a shock of 1%
of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 years. The shaded areas
indicate 90% confidence bands based on robust standard errors clustered by country. The last column
shows the estimated difference between high debt and low debt responses. Dots indicate statistically
significant differences at the 90% level.
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data. The central bank reduces the interest rate by a similar magnitude irrespective
of the private debt state. Overall, both interest rate responses are insignificant for
almost all periods indicating a rather conservative expansionary monetary policy in
reaction to fiscal consolidations. Not surprisingly, the response difference is statistically
insignificant for all years of the forecast horizon.
The IIR is based on assessments of sovereign default risk by private sector analysts
on a scale of zero to 100, with a rating of 100 assigned to the lowest perceived sovereign
default probability. As the third row of Figure 3.4 shows, the index falls when consol-
idations are implemented in a high private debt state, implying a higher probability
of sovereign default. Significant reductions in the IIR are visible up to three years
after the consolidation. Interestingly, even in low debt states the IIR does not increase
but mainly stays unchanged 4 years after the implementation took place. In all of the
five periods, the high debt IIR response is significantly lower than the low debt IIR
response.
Finally, I look at how the government debt-to-GDP ratio is affected by fiscal con-
solidations in both private debt states. In high private debt states, the public debt
burden shows a persistent and significant increase which accumulates to a rise of more
than 4 percentage points at the end of the forecast horizon. In contrast, the govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio does not respond significantly when private leverage is below
average. In addition, the high debt response is estimated to be significantly larger than
the respective low debt response in four out of the five periods considered. In contrast
to reducing public debt burdens which is one of the main goals of fiscal consolidations,
public debt burdens even increase when private debt is high. Together with the effects
on the sovereign default probability, this finding indicates that austerity in high private
debt states is not only associated with high costs for the private sector but also with
a worsening of government finances.
To summarize, besides GDP and consumption, also imports, the employment rate,
the sovereign default risk and, the government debt-to-GDP ratio react differently to
fiscal consolidations depending on the private debt level in the economy.
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Figure 3.4: Employment, Interest Rate, Investors’ Confidence, Public Debt
Note: The first two columns report cumulative changes (in percentage points) in response to a shock
of 1% of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 years. The shaded areas
indicate 90% confidence band based on robust standard errors clustered by country. The last column
shows the estimated difference between high debt and low debt responses. Dots indicate statistically
significant differences at the 90% level.
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3.5 Additional State Variables
In this section it is demonstrated that the result of private debt-dependent effects of
austerity still prevails when I further condition on two other prominent state variables:
the state of the business cycle and government debt overhang.
3.5.1 Booms and Recessions
Jordà and Taylor (2016) show that the costs of fiscal consolidations differ according to
the state of the business cycle. They find that austerity leads to a significant drop in
economic activity when implemented in recessions while there is no significant effect
when consolidations are undertaken in a boom. Additionally, Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012) present empirical evidence that the government spending multiplier is
larger in periods of economic slack. Contrary, Ramey and Zubairy (2014) do not find
significant differences between spending multipliers in good and bad times. To check
whether my findings are sensitive to the state of the business cycle, I further condition
equation (3.1) on expansionary and recessionary states. Thereby, I make use of three
common approaches to differentiate between expansionary and recessionary periods.
As a benchmark case, I use the recession dates published by the OECD. Second, sim-
ilar to Jordà and Taylor (2016), I calculate the cyclical component of GDP measured
as deviations from (country-specific) HP trends with a smoothing parameter λ = 6.25
as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Positive deviations from the trend are defined
as booms and negative deviations as recessions. Third, following the approach pro-
posed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), I construct (country-specific) four-year
moving averages of real GDP growth, and classify periods as expansions (recessions)
whenever the actual growth rate is above (below) the moving average rate.
I reestimate equation (3.1) separately for low and high private debt states based on
the following equation:
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Yi,t+h − Yi,t−1 = IC,i,t−1 [ψC,h(L)Xi,t−1 + βC,hDi,t]
+ ID,i,t−1 [ψD,h(L)Xi,t−1 + βD,hDi,t]
+ IE,i,t−1 [ψE,h(L)Xi,t−1 + βE,hDi,t] + αi,h + ηt,h + i,t+h.
(3.2)
IC,i,t and ID,i,t now indicate the state of the business cycle of the respective private debt
states. In the estimation for high private debt states, IC,i,t measures periods of high
private debt that coincide with periods of economic contractions whereas ID,i,t indicates
periods of high private debt that are also characterized by economic expansions. IE,i,t
is then a dummy variable for being in the opposing private debt state (low private
debt), irrespective of the state of the business cycle. Analogously, in the estimation for
low private debt states, IC,i,t (ID,i,t) measures periods of low private debt that coincide
with periods of economic contractions (expansions) and IE,i,t indicates periods of high
private debt. βC,h and βD,h then provide the state-dependent responses for both debt
states in recessions and booms, respectively.
Figure 3.5 shows the results based on the OECD business cycle classification, whereas
Table 3.4 reports the effects when using the two other classification strategies. Indepen-
dent of the business cycle classification applied, when private debt is high, GDP and
consumption decline significantly in recessionary but also in expansionary periods. In
contrast, in low private debt states the effects of fiscal consolidations are not significant
neither in booms nor in recessions. Moreover, the size of the respective point estimates
in both business cycle states is fairly similar indicating that business cycle-dependent
effects of fiscal consolidations disappear when controlling for private leverage in the
economy.
3.5.2 Government Debt
In addition to the state of the business cycle, previous literature found that the effects
of fiscal policy vary with the level of public debt in the economy. Perotti (1999)
shows that an increase in government consumption leads to higher private consumption
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Figure 3.5: Controlling for State of the Business Cycle
Note: Cumulative changes (in per cent) in response to a shock of 1% of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 years. The shaded areas indicate 90% confidence bands based on
robust standard errors clustered by country.
expenditures when government debt is low, whereas consumption declines when public
debt-to-GDP levels are high. Similar, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) provide
evidence that the government spending multiplier negatively depends on the public
debt level.
To check whether the result of private debt-dependent costs of fiscal consolidations
still holds when controlling for the public debt level, I reestimate equation (3.2) where
IC,i,t and ID,i,t now indicate the respective government debt levels in the periods of
both private debt states. In the estimation for high private debt states, IC,i,t measures
periods of high private debt that coincide with periods of low government debt, whereas
ID,i,t indicates periods of high private debt that are also characterized by high public
debt levels. IE,i,t is then a dummy variable for being in the opposing private debt state
(low private debt), irrespective of the government debt level.24 Periods of high (low)
public debt are defined as positive (negative) deviations of the government debt-to-
GDP ratio from a country-specific smooth HP trend (λ = 10, 000).
24Analogously, in the estimation for low private debt states, IC,i,t (ID,i,t) measures periods of low
private debt that coincide with periods of low (high) public debt burdens and IE,i,t indicates periods
of high private debt.
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Table 3.4: Alternative Business Cycle Classification (effect in year t = 1)
Classification based on
Detrended GDP Boom Recession
High Debt Low Debt High Debt Low Debt
GDP −1.22∗ −0.07 −0.97∗∗ −0.42
(0.79) (0.33) (0.49) (0.41)
Consumption −1.75∗∗∗ −0.28 −1.59∗∗∗ −0.56
(0.70) (0.38) (0.39) (0.61)
Classification based on
MA GDP growth Boom Recession
High Debt Low Debt High Debt Low Debt
GDP −1.08∗ −0.11 −0.98∗∗ −0.47
(0.79) (0.21) (0.58) (0.65)
Consumption −1.56∗∗∗ −0.34 −1.60∗∗∗ −0.55
(0.73) (0.43) (0.52) (0.79)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
Figure 3.6 presents the cumulative responses for both private debt states when con-
trolling for the public debt burden. GDP and private consumption decline significantly
irrespective of the public debt level when private debt is high. In line with the findings
by Perotti (1999) and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013), the effects are larger in
periods of low public debt. When government debt is low, GDP (consumption) is 3.9%
(4.8%) lower four years after the implementation. In high government debt states, the
accumulated loss is 0.7% for GDP and 2.1% for consumption.
Turning to the low private debt responses, I find insignificant effects for periods with
high public debt burdens. When government debt is low, GDP shows a significant
response only in the last period of the forecast horizon, whereas consumption does
not react significantly in all periods. In accordance to the respective high private
debt responses, the point estimates for GDP and consumption are larger when the
government debt level is low.
To sum up, the last two exercises demonstrate that fiscal consolidations implemented
in high private debt states are always a drag on private economic activity, irrespective
of the state of the business cycle or the government debt level. In contrast, austerity
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Figure 3.6: Controlling for Government Debt Level
Note: Cumulative changes (in per cent) in response to a shock of 1% of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 years. The shaded areas indicate 90% confidence bands based on
robust standard errors clustered by country.
measures undertaken in low private debt periods do not have a significant effect on the
economy in booms and recessions, when government debt is high or low. This result
gives rise to the interpretation that effectiveness of fiscal policy does not vary with the
business cycle or the public debt burden but rather with the level of private leverage.
Whether this reasoning also contributes to the controversial debate on state-dependent
government spending multipliers (see for example Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012;
Ramey and Zubairy, 2014) could be an interesting agenda of future research.
3.6 Household Balance Sheet
What is the underlying transmission channel through which my results can be ratio-
nalized? In the following, I present evidence indicating that deterioration in household
balance sheets as proposed by Mian and Sufi (2011, 2012) is of central importance for
understanding private debt-dependent responses to fiscal consolidations. They stress
that the large drop in private demand during the Great Recession was mainly caused
by a worsening in housing net worth of highly leveraged households. Moreover, U.S.
counties with a larger decline in housing net worth were found to experience a larger de-
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cline in employment. In a recent paper, Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2015) empirically show
that an increase in private debt is associated with lower output growth in the future.
This result only holds for increases in household debt, while for rises in corporate debt
the authors do not find significant future output effects. In a theoretical framework,
Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri (2015) show that the spending multiplier increases with the
level of households’ indebtedness. Their model economy is populated by two types of
households, lenders and borrowers. Borrowing households face a collateral constraint
which limits the maximum loans that an individual can get to a fraction of the liqui-
dation value of the amount of housing held by the household, the loan-to-value ratio.
By assuming that the collateral constraint holds with equality in equilibrium, it can be
shown that borrowing households discount the future more heavily than lending house-
holds. This model feature is backed by the empirical finding that indebted households
have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth (Mian, Rao, and
Sufi, 2013). In a simulation exercise, Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri (2015) show that the size
of the spending multiplier positively depends on the share of borrowers in the economy
and the loan-to-value ratio, which in turn depend on the level of indebtedness. Taken
together, all these studies find that a high level of household indebtedness amplifies
the effects to economic shocks.
The central determinant of housing net worth are real estate prices. Mian and
Sufi (2011, 2012) demonstrate that changes in house prices crucially affect private
consumption expenditures. Falling house prices led to a deterioration in households
balance sheets which, through the housing net worth channel, resulted in the large
reduction in economic activity observed during the Great Recession. Andrés, Boscá,
and Ferri (2015) model house prices as one variable of the liquidation value households
can use as collateral to borrow against.
Given these considerations, my results are tested in two additional dimensions. First,
I split private debt into household debt and corporate debt and check whether my
findings depend on the specific type of private leverage. Second, I show how house
prices respond to fiscal consolidations in high and low private debt states.
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Table 3.5: Household Debt vs. Corporate Debt (effect in year t = 1)
Private debt type Household debt Corporate Debt
High Debt Low Debt Difference High Debt Low Debt Difference
GDP −0.89∗∗ −0.01 −0.87∗∗ −0.69 −0.45 −0.25
(0.53) (0.57) (0.56) (0.46)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
Table 3.5 presents the different GDP responses in low/high corporate debt and
low/high household debt states. Equation (3.1) is separately estimated for both types
of private debt. Series on corporate debt and household debt are taken from the Bank
for International Settlements, where, due to data limitations, the panel is now restricted
to the period 1980-2008 and the countries Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, France,
United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United States. To obtain private debt-
to-GDP series, I divide the respective debt series by nominal GDP. As before, low/high
corporate debt and household debt periods are identified as deviations from a smooth
trend (HP-filter with λ = 10, 000).
It turns out that my major finding of private debt-dependent effects of fiscal con-
solidations is mainly driven by households’ leveraging position and not corporate debt
overhang. The fall in GDP in response to austerity is not significant when corpo-
rate debt is high. In contrast, GDP declines significantly when private households are
highly leveraged. Although the effect in high corporate debt states is somewhat larger
than in low corporate debt states, the difference between both responses is statistically
insignificant. A different picture emerges for household debt. The response difference
between high and low household debt states is estimated to be statistically significant.
In line with the findings by Mian and Sufi (2011, 2012) and Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri
(2015), the results in Table 3.5 point to the important role of household leveraging for
the economic dynamics to fiscal interventions. Corporate debt levels do not seem to
be responsible for understanding private debt-dependent effects of fiscal policy.
Given the prominent role of households’ leveraging position for understanding my
results, it seems natural to investigate how the central driver of housing wealth, house
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prices, react to fiscal consolidations in low/high private debt periods. As mentioned
earlier, house prices are one key ingredient of households’ optimal consumption deci-
sion. Falling house prices reduce the home equity value that serves as collateral to
borrow against, which ultimately results in lower consumption expenditures by con-
strained agents (Mian and Sufi, 2011, 2012). To test whether this transmission channel
also applies to my findings, Figure 3.7 shows the response of house prices to fiscal con-
solidations implemented in low and high private debt states. House price data are
taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (Mack and Martínez-García, 2011). At
each horizon, house prices are projected on fiscal consolidations and their respective
lag is included in the vector of control variables Xi,t. House prices enter the estimation
in log differences.
Figure 3.7 shows that the response of house prices crucially depends on the private
debt level when the fiscal consolidation is undertaken. House prices do not react
significantly when private leverage is low. However, in a high private debt state house
prices significantly fall with a accumulated decline of almost 10% after five years. As the
last column of Figure 3.7 demonstrates, the difference between the respective responses
is statistically significant for all five periods.
Although causal interpretations should be taken cautiously, the evidence shown in
this section indicates that private debt-dependent costs of fiscal consolidations can
be rationalized through deterioration in household balance sheets. Theories should,
therefore, elaborate on the housing net worth channel (Mian and Sufi, 2011, 2012)
when studying the consequences of fiscal policy interventions.
3.7 Conclusion
Motivated by recent theoretical contributions that show the effects of fiscal policy to
be larger in periods of high private leverage (see for example Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri,
2015; Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012; Kaplan and Violante, 2014), this paper has
shown that the level of private indebtedness significantly determines the costs of fiscal
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Figure 3.7: House Prices
Note: Cumulative changes (in per cent) in response to a shock of 1% of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 years. The shaded areas indicate 90% confidence bands based on
robust standard errors clustered by country.
consolidations. Based on a panel of 12 OECD countries, I use local projection methods,
which allow responses to differ between low debt and high debt states.
I find that austerity implemented in a low private debt state does not induce sig-
nificant changes in GDP and private consumption. In contrast, fiscal consolidations
lead to severe contractions in GDP and private consumption when private debt is high.
This result is robust to different ways of identifying fiscal consolidations, alternative
definitions of low/high private debt states, the composition of fiscal consolidations,
controlling for the state of the business cycle and government debt overhang. In addi-
tion, the finding of private debt-dependent costs of fiscal consolidations is still present
when extending the sample such that it includes large-scale austerity programs im-
plemented in the period 2010-2014. Imports and employment fall significantly when
private leverage is high, while they do not show any significant effect when private
debt is low. Moreover, in high private debt states, consolidations lead to a persistent
increase in the government debt-to-GDP ratio which contradicts with one of the main
goals of fiscal austerity that lies in reducing public debt burdens.
Two additional findings highlight the importance of the housing net worth channel
(Mian and Sufi, 2011, 2012) for understanding my results. First, the private debt-
dependent responses to fiscal consolidations are mainly driven by household debt and
not corporate debt. Second, I show that house prices significantly decline when con-
solidations are implemented in a period of private debt overhang. Both of these latter
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observations indicate that deterioration in household balance sheets represents a pos-
sible channel through which my results can be explained.
My findings reveal important implications. They confirm predictions of theoretical
models as the ones by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Kaplan and Violante (2014)
and Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri (2015), which point out the impact of fiscal policy in-
terventions to be larger in periods of private debt overhang. Moreover, high private
debt levels in Southern European countries may have amplified the negative effects of
large-scale fiscal consolidations. Contrary to its objective of improving public finances,
austerity measures could have even increased solvency problems. More generally speak-
ing, the level of private debt and especially of household debt seems to matter for the
effects of fiscal policy.
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3.A Appendix
This appendix includes all data definitions and sources and reports the results of ad-
ditional estimation results and robustness checks mentioned in the text.
Table A3.1 presents all data definitions and sources.
Table A3.2 reports the identified narrative fiscal shocks for the period 2010-2014.
Table A3.3 shows that my results are not affected when using CAPBt in levels as
control variable in the regressions. The baseline results still hold when controlling for
CAPBt instead of ∆CAPBt.
Table A3.4 demonstrates that private debt-dependent effects of fiscal consolidations
also emerge when using credit data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The local projections using the BIS-credit data are based on the years 1980-2009.
Table A3.5 shows the effects when controlling for country-specific time trends in my
baseline specification. It turns out, that my main finding is not affected when allowing
for a possible trending behavior in the endogenous variables.
To rule out that my results are driven by the Global Financial Crises, Table A3.6
presents the results when considering the 1978-2006 sample. My estimates are robust
to leaving out the Crises years.
To assess how important any individual country is for the results, I reestimate the local
projections, while dropping one country at a time from the sample. As Table A3.7
indicates, the results are comparable to the baseline in each case.
Figure A3.1 presents results when estimating the baseline regressions for a longer hori-
zon. All variables show the tendency to converge back to steady state seven years after
the consolidation was implemented. This gives rise to the interpretation that fiscal
consolidations have long-lasting, but non-permanent negative effects. Together with
Table A3.5 this finding indicates that my findings are not driven by unstable impulse
responses.
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The baseline sample covers the period 1978-2008 and the countries Australia, Canada,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United States.
Table A3.1: Data Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
GDP, real Gross domestic product, constant prices, OECD
base year
OECD
GDP, nominal Gross domestic product, current prices, current
PPPs, in US Dollar
OECD
Consumption Final consumption expenditures, households and
non-profit institutions serving households, constant
prices, OECD base year
OECD
CAPB Cyclically-adjusted primary balance Alesina and Ardagna (2010)
Private debt to GDP End-of-year amount of outstanding domestic cur-
rency lending by domestic banks to domestic
households and nonfinancial corporations (exclud-
ing lending within the financial system) to GDP
Schularick and Taylor (2012)
Fiscal consolidation Changes in fiscal policy motivated by a desire to
reduce the budget deficit and not by responding th
prospective economic conditions
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori
(2014)
Investment Gross fixed capital formation, constant prices,
OECD base year
OECD
Imports Imports of goods and services, constant prices,
OECD base year
OECD
Exports Exports of goods and services, constant prices,
OECD base year
OECD
Employment rate Civilian employment as % population (15-64 years
old)
OECD
Interest rate Main central bank policy interest rate Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori
(2014)
Institutional Investors Rating In-
dex
Assessments of sovereign risk by private sector ana-
lysts on a scale to 100, with a rating of 100 assigned
to the lowest perceived sovereign default probabil-
ity
Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori
(2014)
Household debt End-of-year credit to households and NPISHs from
all sectors, market value, in US Dollar, adjusted for
breaks
Bank for International Settle-
ments; sample restricted to 1980-
2008, no data for Denmark and
Netherlands
Corporate debt End-of-year credit to non-financial corporations
from all sectors, market value, in US Dollar, ad-
justed for breaks
Bank for International Settle-
ments; sample restricted to 1980-
2008, no data for Denmark and
Netherlands
Total credit to private sector End-of-year credit to private non-financial sector
from all sectors, market value, market value, in US
Dollar, Adjusted for breaks
Bank for International Settle-
ments; sample restricted to 1980-
2014
House prices Real house prices index (four-quarter average) Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
(Mack and Martínez-García, 2011)
Public debt to GDP Face value of total general government debt out-
standing to GDP
Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor
(2016a)
OECD recession indicator OECD based recession indicator from the peak
through the trough
OECD
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In extending the narrative consolidation measure, I closely follow Dell’ Erba, Mat-
tina, and Roitman (2015) and Agca and Igan (2013) who construct a series of the
consolidation measure for the years 2010 and 2011. The extension of the dataset is
based on the following three OECD reports: Restoring Public Finances, 2011, Restor-
ing Public Finances, 2012 Update, and The State of Public Finances, 2015. These
reports outline the economic situation, fiscal consolidation strategy and major consol-
idation measures for each of the OECD member countries. The country notes in each
report lay out each government’s rationale for pursuing fiscal adjustment and are used
to identify consolidation periods that were motivated by a desire for deficit reduction.
Table A3.2: Narrative Fiscal Shock, 2010-2014 (% GDP).
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Australia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Canada 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.20
Germany 0.00 0.50 1.50 0.60 0.30
Denmark 0.00 0.90 0.00 1.10 −0.45
Spain 2.70 2.20 0.80 0.30 0.60
France 0.00 1.10 1.40 1.50 1.00
United Kingdom 0.60 1.20 1.00 1.00 −0.10
Italy 0.00 0.90 3.40 −0.49 0.47
Japan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 0.00 0.30 0.70 2.10 1.90
Sweden 0.00 0.40 0.00 −0.60 −0.90
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
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Table A3.3: Controlling for CAPB (effect in year t = 1)
GDP Consumption
Specification High Debt Low Debt High Debt Low Debt
Baseline (∆CAPBt) −1.13∗∗∗ −0.21 −1.72∗∗∗ −0.44
(0.50) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46)
CAPBt −0.89∗∗ −0.64 −1.54∗∗∗ −0.82
(0.52) (0.46) (0.41) (0.74)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
Table A3.4: Using BIS-Credit Data (effect in year t = 1)
Definition GDP Consumption
based on High Debt Low Debt Difference High Debt Low Debt Difference
Baseline −1.13∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.92∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −0.44 −1.28∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46)
BIS-credit data −0.85∗∗ 0.01 −0.86∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗∗ −0.23 −1.11∗∗∗
sample: 1980-2009 (0.50) (0.33) (0.38) (0.48)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
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Table A3.5: Controlling for Linear Time Trend (effect in year t = 1)
GDP Consumption
Specification High Debt Low Debt Difference High Debt Low Debt Difference
Baseline −1.13∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.92∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −0.44 −1.28∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46)
Country-specific −0.90∗∗ −0.11 −0.79∗∗∗ −1.52∗∗∗ −0.24 −1.28∗∗∗
time trend (0.46) (0.33) (0.42) (0.53)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
Table A3.6: Leaving out Global Financial Crises (effect in year t = 1)
GDP Consumption
Specification High Debt Low Debt Difference High Debt Low Debt Difference
Baseline −1.13∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.92∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −0.44 −1.28∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46)
1978-2006 sample −0.94∗∗∗ −0.20 −0.74∗∗∗ −1.58∗∗∗ −0.39 −1.19∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.31) (0.38) (0.49)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
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Table A3.7: Dropping one Country at a Time (effect in year t = 1)
GDP Consumption
Country excluded High Debt Low Debt Difference High Debt Low Debt Difference
Baseline −1.13∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.92∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −0.44 −1.28∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.32) (0.38) (0.46)
Australia −0.95∗∗ −0.25 −0.71∗∗ −1.54∗∗∗ −0.25 −1.10∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.32) (0.39) (0.32)
Canada −0.93∗∗ −0.06 −0.87∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗ −0.29 −1.32∗∗∗
(0.52) (0.28) (0.44) (0.43)
Germany −1.19∗∗∗ −0.25 −0.94∗∗∗ −1.78∗∗∗ −0.44 −1.35∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.33) (0.43) (0.47)
Denmark −1.09∗∗∗ −0.36 −0.73∗∗ −1.71∗∗∗ −1.01∗ −0.70∗∗
(0.51) (0.53) (0.43) (0.65)
Spain −1.04∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.97∗∗∗ −1.66∗∗∗ −0.28 −1.38∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.27) (0.34) (0.39)
France −1.16∗∗∗ −0.22 −0.94∗∗∗ −1.74∗∗∗ −0.39 −1.35∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.32) (0.41) (0.43)
United Kingdom −1.06∗∗ −0.27 −0.79∗∗ −1.60∗∗∗ −0.46 −1.14∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.33) (0.42) (0.48)
Italy −1.89∗∗∗ −0.29 −1.60∗∗∗ −2.15∗∗∗ −0.62 −1.53∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.40) (0.54) (0.58)
Japan −0.89∗∗∗ −0.29 −0.60∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗∗ −0.52 −0.87∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.35) (0.26) (0.51)
Netherlands −0.88∗ −0.01 −0.87∗∗ −1.55∗∗∗ −0.15 −1.40∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.26) (0.44) (0.32)
Sweden −1.22∗∗∗ −0.36 −0.86∗∗ −1.79∗∗∗ −0.53 −1.26∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.38) (0.41) (0.55)
United States −0.99∗∗ −0.17 −0.82∗∗ −1.52∗∗∗ −0.37 −1.15∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.31) (0.37) (0.47)
Notes: The table reports point estimates and robust standard errors clustered by country in paren-
theses. In each case the shocks are normalized so that the CAPB rises by 1% of GDP in year t = 0.
∗Significant at 16%; ∗∗significant at 10%; ∗∗∗significant at 5%.
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Figure A3.1: Estimating for Longer Horizon
Note: Cumulative changes (in per cent) in response to a shock of 1% of GDP to the cyclically-adjusted
primary balance over h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 years. The shaded areas indicate 90% confidence bands
based on robust standard errors clustered by country.
102
4 Technology Shocks, Tax Cuts and their
Impact on Private Household Debt
Co-authors: Christopher Krause, Nils Wittmann
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of total factor productivity shocks and tax innova-
tions on household debt. Using vector autoregressions on US time series, we find that
private borrowing increases substantially in response to both shocks. To account for
these findings, we propose a DSGE model in which households’ borrowing is limited by
a collateral constraint, where durables play the role of collateral assets. By applying
impulse response matching, we estimate structural parameters of the model and show
that the model is capable of explaining the empirical observations.
Keywords: Financial Frictions, TFP shocks, Tax Shocks, Structural Estimation.
JEL Codes: E21, E32, E44.
4.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1980s, total household debt increased substantially and
almost doubled relative to GDP or private personal income in the US economy. This
significant rise in household leveraging has led to a strand of literature studying the
interaction between financial markets and the macroeconomy.25 This study empirically
investigates the impact of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks and tax innovations
on household debt for the US economy and proposes a model with financial frictions
that is capable of explaining the empirical observations.
25Some influential studies are Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1998),
and Iacoviello (2008).
103
It is widely agreed that introducing financial frictions into stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) models changes the economic dynamics to shocks not just quantitatively
but also qualitatively. Monacelli (2009) demonstrates that financial frictions are needed
to account for the non-durable and durable consumption responses to a monetary pol-
icy shock as observed in the data. Based on vector autoregressions, Andrés, Boscá,
and Ferri (2015) find that an expansionary government spending shock is followed by a
significant and persistent increase in household debt. The authors propose a model in
which private borrowing is limited to the value of the households’ collateral in order to
replicate the empirical impulse responses.26 Based on these findings, this paper empiri-
cally shows that household debt moves procyclically in response to TFP shocks and tax
innovations. Additionally, it is demonstrated that a DSGE model in which borrowing
is limited by a collateral constraint can successfully account for these empirical results.
To study the impact on household debt, (i) the TFP series from Basu, Fernald, and
Kimball (2006) and (ii) the Romer and Romer (2010) tax measure is incorporated into
recursive SVARs. We select the TFP shock because technology improvements are one,
among others, of the major drivers of the business cycle (e.g. Fisher (2006), Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010)). Moreover, Mertens and Ravn (2012) empirically
show that tax changes induce important impulses to US output fluctuations. Also,
tax changes represent an important instrument for the fiscal authority to stimulate the
economy. Thus, we study the effects of a fiscal and a non-fiscal shock.
So far, both of these shock series were mainly used to quantify their dynamic effects
on variables like output, consumption or hours worked,27 whereas this paper takes a
closer look at how household debt evolves to changes in both measures.
Our empirical results suggest that increases in total factor productivity, as well as
tax cuts, lead to a significant and persistent increase in household debt. Moreover,
this paper finds that both shocks have expansionary effects on output, durable, and
26In a similar vein, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) theoretical show that the size of the government
spending multiplier crucially depends on the degree of financial market imperfections.
27For the TFP shock see, among others, Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) , Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Vigfusson (2004) and for the tax shock some prominent examples are Romer and Romer
(2010), Mertens and Ravn (2012), Favero and Giavazzi (2012).
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non-durable consumption. These findings indicate that the rise in economic activity
in response to both shocks is partly financed by an increase in private borrowing.
From a theoretical perspective, a positive debt response refutes consumption smoothing
which assumes households to save in good times and borrow in bad. However, it is
demonstrated that a theoretical model in which borrowing is limited by a collateral
constraint as suggested by Monacelli (2009) produces such positive debt responses
following both shocks. By applying impulse response matching it is then shown that
this approach is capable of successfully explaining the empirical results.
Our proposed DSGE model is closely related to those used in the housing literature
(Iacoviello, 2008) and in the literature on durable goods (Monacelli, 2009). The model
economy is populated by two types of households, different in their willingness to
postpone consumption into the future, which creates borrowers and lenders. Both
agents earn after-tax labor income and receive utility from leisure and consuming a
basket of durable and non-durable goods. The government purchases a stream of goods
which is financed by distortionary labor income taxes and balances its budget every
period by paying out lump-sum transfers. As the central building block of the model,
borrowers face a collateral constraint so that the amount of newly issued private debt
is restricted to a fraction of the value of their durable stock. Both economic shocks
lead to an expansion in the modeled economy characterized by increases in output,
non-durable consumption, and durable consumption. By assuming that the borrowing
constraint holds with equality in the neighborhood of the steady-state, discount factors
of the two types of households have to differ, as Iacoviello (2008) and Monacelli (2009)
have shown.
To bring theoretical impulse responses as close as possible to the empirical data, deep
model parameters are estimated. Instead of comparing the impulse responses from
structural VARs to the theoretical responses from a model, this approach minimizes
the distance between structural VAR responses run on the data and identical VAR
responses run on simulated model data. Thus, the US data and the model simulations
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are treated equally so that problems like small-sample biases or lag-truncation biases
are avoided (Cogley and Nason, 1995; Kehoe, 2006).
Our results from the matching procedure suggest that the model can successfully
account for the sizes and the hump-shaped patterns of the empirical dynamics in all four
variables. In line with the empirical findings, the model produces persistent increases
in household debt which last for more than 20 quarters. Moreover, the models’ debt
responses almost perfectly match the empirical counterparts. The point estimates of
deep model parameters are in line with findings by previous studies (Mertens and
Ravn, 2011). We estimate that almost 50% of all households are faced with a collateral
constraint so that their ability to borrow to finance consumption is limited.
This study is a contribution to the existing literature in two dimensions. It is the
first study giving a precise estimate for households’ debt responses to technology im-
provements and tax cuts based on SVARs. Additionally, this paper contributes to the
literature by showing that an estimated DSGE model with financial frictions matches
the empirical responses of the major variable of interest, household debt, but also
output, non-durable consumption, and durable consumption, to these shocks quanti-
tatively.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the results
from the SVAR estimation. Section 3 lays out the theoretical model. Section 4 describes
the models’ calibration and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the results of the
impulse response matching approach. Finally, the last Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present our data, estimation method, and SVAR results on the
impact of technology shocks and tax cuts on total household debt and other main
aggregates of interest.
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4.2.1 Data and Identification
Our benchmark VAR consists of five variables. Apart from the main variable of inter-
est, total household debt (dt), we include output (yt), non-durable consumption (cnt ),
consumption expenditures on durables (cdt ), as well as one of the two shock measures,
technology (zt) or the tax innovation (τt). All variables are linearly detrended before
estimation and enter the VAR in logs of real per capita, seasonally adjusted values.
Precise definitions and data sources are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Data Sources
Variable Definition
y Output Log of per capita Nominal gross domestic product divided
by the GDP deflator
cn Non-durable consumption Log of per capita (personal consumption expenditures on
non durables plus personal expenditures on services) di-
vided by each individual price deflator
cd Durable purchases Log of per capita personal purchases of durable consump-
tion goods divided by its deflator
d Total private debt Log of per capita total private debt, divided by the con-
sumer price index
τ Tax Shock Romer and Romer (2010) exogenous tax shock
z Technology Shock Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) exogenous technology
Shock
Notes: All data are linearly detrended and logs of real per capita, seasonally adjusted values and
are obtained from FRED database. Full time series specific information and sources can be found
in the appendix.
We measure the impact of technology shocks using the TFP series computed in
Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006). This series is a Solow residual-based measure of
technology corrected for labor and capital utilization, non-constant returns to scale,
and imperfect competition.
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To cope with the issue of endogenous and exogenous tax changes, we utilize the
Romer and Romer (2010) tax measure.28 The authors take a narrative approach to
disentangling exogenous and endogenous tax change effects by analyzing presidential
speeches, the Economic Reports of the President and reports of Congressional com-
mittees. Their resulting shock series is measured in changes in tax revenues relative to
GDP, discounted to the day when the bill was signed, to avoid a misalignment of the
data set and agents’ economic choices, also called fiscal foresight.
Since the identification of the empirical model depends on the nature of the two
shock series, i.e. if they are (strictly) exogenous, we perform Granger causality tests.
In particular, we use these tests to find the suited VAR estimation method.
The results are summarized in Table 4.2. We find that the lags of output and durable
consumption Granger cause TFP at the 95% significant level, which is in contrast to
results reported in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)29. When testing whether the
Romer and Romer (2010) tax measure can be predicted by past observations of our
main aggregates, Granger causality cannot be rejected either. Lagged values of output
and durable consumption include information which help predict future tax changes.
Table 4.2: Granger Causality Test Results
Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) TFP series Romer and Romer (2010) tax series
Sample Obs F-stat p-value Sample Obs F-stat p-value
Output 1966−2014 191 2.395 0.042 1966−2007 164 2.487 0.025
Nondurables Cons. 1966−2014 191 1.723 0.146 1966−2007 164 1.486 0.186
Durables Purchases 1966−2014 191 3.673 0.006 1966−2007 164 2.871 0.011
Private Debt 1966−2014 191 0.967 0.426 1966−2007 164 1.121 0.303
Notes: Null hypothesis: The variable does not Granger cause the TFP / tax measure. Specification:
six lags, linearly detrended data for output, non-durable consumption, durable consumption, hours
worked, household debt (d) and TFP index as used in VARs. The Romer and Romer tax series is
recoded as in Mertens and Ravn (2012).
28Actual changes in tax rates or tax revenues are a linear combination of exogenous and endogenous
tax changes, which would dilute the structural effect of tax innovations on total private debt. We
hence seek to use a measure for exogenous tax changes only, rather than including automatic tax
adjustments that co-move with the business cycle.
29One explanation for the different results may be the different and shorter period considered by
Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006).
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Given these results, treating both measures as strictly exogenous series seems mis-
leading and estimating exogenous VARs, as done in Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)
and Mertens and Ravn (2012), will not reveal the true impact of technology shocks
and tax innovations on the variables of interest.
We acknowledge the fact of contemporaneous exogeneity of the two shock series by
estimating VARs, in which the specific shock series are ordered first. This identification
approach implies, that the TFP and the tax measure are contemporaneously unaffected
by the other variables in the system while the subsequent variables have an impact
through the lag structures. Our baseline SVAR takes the following form
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + ut, (4.1)
in which Xt = [st, yt, cnt , cdt , dt]′, st ∈ {zt, τt}. A(L) is a lag polynomial of order 4 and
the estimation includes a constant term. Finally, ut denotes reduced form residuals,
and their variance-covariance matrix is orthogonalized by Cholesky decomposition, and
the VAR is estimated using ordinary least squares.
Both shocks enter our SVARs along with quarterly US data from 1966q1 to 2007q4
for the tax shock and 1966q1 to 2014q4 for the TFP shock. Due to data limitations of
the tax measure the two samples have different lengths.
4.2.2 VAR Results
We produce one set of impulse responses for the TFP shock and one for the tax cut.
The size of the technology shock is the equivalent to an increase of one percent in the
Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) measure for total factor productivity. The Romer
and Romer (2010) structural tax shock is equivalent to a reduction of total tax revenues
relative to GDP of one percentage point. We report impulse responses together with
68% (dark gray), and 84% (light gray) bootstrapped confidence bands, computed with
10.000 bootstrap replications. Figure 4.1 (a) depicts the results for the TFP shock and
Figure 4.1 (b) those for the tax cut.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Responses SVAR Estimation
(a) TFP Shock (b) Tax Shock
Notes: SVAR impulse responses to a one percent increase in TFP (a) and a one percentage point
decrease in tax revenues over GDP along with 68% (dark gray) and 84% (light gray) bootstrapped
centered confidence intervals with 10.000 bootstrapped replications. Reduced form residual variance-
covariance matrices are Cholesky decomposed.
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Both, the tax reduction and the increase in technological progress initiate an expan-
sion characterized by hump-shaped dynamics in output, non-durable consumption, and
durable expenditures. This boom is persistent, lasting for more than five years before
the economy returns to its pre-shock level. While most of the variables do not change
on impact when the economy faces a tax cut, the TFP shock influences the aggregates
already on impact.
With respect to our primary variable of interest, household debt, we find that both
shocks lead to a significant and persistent increase in private borrowing. This result
indicates that the expansion in the economy is partly financed by a rise in household
debt. For the TFP shock, household debt peaks after around 5 quarters, while for the
tax cuts it converges back to pre-shock levels later. From a theoretical perspective,
a sharp rise in household debt following both shocks is in contrast to consumption
smoothing of households. This assumption would predict a fall in private borrowing in
expansionary times as a buffer against future negative shocks.30
Concerning the volatility of our endogenous variables, we can detect a clear pattern in
responses to both exogenous innovations. Durable purchases and household debt react
the strongest following both shocks.31 Non-durable consumption shows the smallest
increases of all endogenous variables included in our VAR estimations.
These empirical findings are robust to alternative orderings of the variables in the
VARs, less or additional lags, including hours in the estimation and, to the introduc-
tion of alternative variables. We find that the initially observed positive comovement
between household debt and the other real variables remains intact.
4.3 Model
This section presents a DSGE model with financial frictions that we will use later
to reproduce our empirical findings. The model consists of two types of households,
30If we include the unemployment rate in our estimation, we find that unemployment is reduced
after the two shocks. Thus, the rise in household debt is not caused by a decrease in household income.
31We interpret this strong comovement between durable purchases and household debt as justifi-
cation for the borrowing constraint in our model which we describe in the next section.
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a representative final goods firm, a monopolistically competitive intermediate goods
sector, and a government sector.
4.3.1 Households
The model economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households that
are heterogeneous in terms of their desire to save. Hence, a fraction χ of households
becomes lenders (subscript l), while the remaining fraction 1 − χ becomes borrowers
(subscript b). Borrowing households face a collateral constraint which ensures that
private borrowing is restricted to a certain amount of their stock of durables.
Lenders. Lending households’ preferences are given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtl
Υ 1−σl,t − 1
1− σ − γl
n1+ηl,t
1 + η
 , (4.2)
where E0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on all information available
at time 0. 0 < βl < 1 is the lenders’ specific discount factor, σ > 0 is a curvature
parameter, γl > 0 is the preference weight that measures disutility of labor, nl,t, and
η ≥ 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity.
Υl,t denotes a consumption basket defined as
Υl,t = cϑl,tv1−ϑl,t−1 − ψlcϑl,t−1v1−ϑl,t−2, (4.3)
where cl,t is consumption of non-durable goods and vl,t−1 denotes the stock of durable
goods held at the beginning of period t. ϑ ∈ [0, 1] measures the elasticity of substitution
between non-durable and durable consumption, and ψl ∈ [0, 1] governs the lenders’
degree of habit persistence. We follow Mertens and Ravn (2011) by assuming that
non-durable and durable consumption are complementary goods for households, which
is assured by the specific functional form of (4.3).
112
Lending households maximize (4.2) with respect to their budget constraint given by
cl,t + xl,t + bl,t + dl,t ≤ (1− τt)wtnl,t + (1 + rg,t−1)bl,t−1
pit
+ (1 + rd,t−1)
dl,t−1
pit
+ Πt
χ
+ trt,
(4.4)
where pit = pt/pt−1 is the gross inflation rate and bl,t are the lender’s holdings of one-
period government bonds with interest rg,t. Lenders receive after-tax labor income,
(1− τt)wtnl,t, where τt is the labor income tax rate and wt is the real wage rate which
households take as given. xl,t represents purchases of new durable goods. In addition,
lending households earn financial income, (1 + rd,t−1)dl,t−1, from offering one-period
private debt to borrowers at interest rd,t−1 which is guaranteed to be repaid in the next
period. trt denotes lump-sum transfers paid by the fiscal authority and Πt/χ are the
individual profits from owning intermediate goods firms.
The law of motion for the durable stock is given by
vl,t =
1− φv2
(
xl,t
xl,t−1
− 1
)2xl,t + (1− δv)vl,t−1, (4.5)
in which δv denotes a constant depreciation rate and the parameter φv captures costs
of adjusting the stock of durable goods. We choose this quadratic and convex func-
tional form since it satisfies the properties generally imposed on adjustment costs (see,
for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).32 Letting λl,t be the lenders’
Lagrange multiplier corresponding to their budget constraint, the first-order condi-
32Let Φ(xt/xt−1) be the general adjustment cost function. Then, convexity implies Φ(1) = Φ′(1) =
0 and Φ′′(1) = φv > 0 which is assured by the functional form in (4.5).
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tions (FOCs) for non-durable consumption, government bond holdings, hours worked,
durable consumption, debt supply, and durable purchases are given by
cl,t : λl,t = ϑ
(
Υ−σl,t − ψlβlEtΥ−σl,t+1
)(vl,t−1
cl,t
)1−ϑ
, (4.6)
bl,t : λl,t = βlEt
{
λl,t+1
1 + rg,t
pit+1
}
, (4.7)
nl,t : λl,t(1− τt)wt = γlnηl,t, (4.8)
vl,t : λl,tqv,t = βlEt
{
λl,t+1
[(
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
cl,t+1
vl,t
+ qv,t+1(1− δv)
]}
, (4.9)
dl,t : λl,t = βlEt
{
λl,t+1
1 + rd,t
pit+1
}
, (4.10)
xl,t : 1− qv,t
1− φv2
(
xl,t
xl,t−1
− 1
)2
− φv
(
xl,t
xl,t−1
− 1
)
xl,t
xl,t−1

= βlEt
λl,t+1λl,t qv,t+1φv
(
xl,t+1
xl,t
− 1
)(
xl,t+1
xl,t
)2 ,
(4.11)
where qv,t denotes the lenders’ shadow value of new consumer durables. Equation (4.6)
states that λl,t equals the marginal utility of non-durable consumption. Equation (4.7)
is the standard Euler equation for government bond holdings. Equation (4.8) sets the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equal to the after-tax
real wage rate. Equation (4.9) shows that the shadow value of new consumer durables
is equal to the expected discounted utility stream received from the durable stock (net
of depreciation). Equation (4.10) sets λl,t equal to the expected discounted utility
stream of future debt interest rate payments. Equation (4.11) states that the change
in consumer durables is related to the expected discounted value of current and future
levels of qv,t.
Borrowers. Preferences of borrowing households are defined as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb
Υ 1−σb,t − 1
1− σ − γb
n1+ηb,t
1 + η
 , (4.12)
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in which 0 < βb < 1 is the specific discount factor of borrowers, γb > 0 is a scal-
ing parameter measuring the borrowers disutility of labor, nb,t. Again, Υb,t denotes a
consumption basket defined as
Υb,t = cϑb,tv1−ϑb,t−1 − ψbcϑb,t−1v1−ϑb,t−2. (4.13)
Here, cb,t denotes borrowers’ consumption of non-durable goods and vb,t−1 is the stock
of durable goods held at the beginning of period t. ψb ∈ [0, 1] measures the borrowers’
degree of habit persistence.
The budget constraint of borrowing households is given by
cb,t + xb,t + (1 + rd,t−1)
db,t−1
pit
≤ (1− τt)wtnb,t + db,t + trt. (4.14)
xb,t denotes borrowers’ purchases of new consumer durables and db,t is the amount of
one-period-debt received from lenders which has to be repaid plus interest rd,t−1 in the
subsequent period. (1− τt)wtnb,t denotes borrowers’ after-tax labor income.
The borrowers’ stock of durables accumulates according to
vb,t =
1− φv2
(
xb,t
xb,t−1
− 1
)2xb,t + (1− δv)vb,t−1. (4.15)
As a central building block of our model, borrowing is endogenously determined by a
collateral constraint, similar to the one used in Iacoviello (2008) and Monacelli (2009).
The amount of debt that has to be repaid by borrowers in the following period, db,t, is
the net-of-depreciation durable stock
db,t ≤ κ(1− δv)vb,t, (4.16)
where κ > 0 denotes the share of borrowers’ durable stock that can be used as collateral.
This borrowing constraint implies two noteworthy points. First, by assuming that
(4.16) holds with equality, βb has to be smaller than βl, and thus, borrowers hold a
positive steady state amount of debt. Second, changes in the stock of durable goods
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affect borrowing but also spending (of constrained households). The magnitude of this
effect crucially depends on the size of κ.
The borrowers FOCs take the following expressions
cb,t : λl,t = ϑ
(
Υ−σb,t − ψbβbEtΥ−σb,t+1
)(vb,t−1
cb,t
)1−ϑ
, (4.17)
nb,t : λb,t(1− τt)wt = γbnηb,t, (4.18)
vb,t : λb,tqx,t = βbEt
{
λb,t+1
[(
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
cb,t+1
vb,t
+ qx,t+1(1− δv)
]}
+ µt(1− δv)κ, (4.19)
db,t : λb,t = βbEt
{
λb,t+1
1 + rd,t
pit+1
}
+ µt, (4.20)
xb,t : 1− qx,t
1− φv2
(
xb,t
xb,t−1
− 1
)2
− φv
(
xb,t
xb,t−1
− 1
)
xb,t
xb,t−1

= βbEt
λb,t+1λb,t qx,t+1φv
(
xb,t+1
xb,t
− 1
)(
xb,t+1
xb,t
)2 ,
(4.21)
where λb,t is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowers budget constraint, µt denotes the
Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint (4.16), and qx,t denotes the borrowers
shadow value of new consumer durable purchases. Interpretations of equations (4.17),
(4.18), and (4.21) are identical to those of lending households. The last term of (4.19)
governs that the shadow value of new consumer durables is related to the marginal util-
ity of relaxing the collateral constrained measured though the time-varying Lagrange
multiplier µt. (4.20) shows that for positive values of µt the marginal utility of cur-
rent consumption is larger than the marginal value of shifting one unit of consumption
intertemporally. A higher value for µt induces a larger marginal benefit of increasing
the stock of durable consumption goods which leads to a loosening of the collateral
constraint to purchase additional current consumption.
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4.3.2 Firms
The firm sector consists of a perfectly competitive final goods firm and a continuum of
monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms. Each intermediate goods firm
i ∈ [0, 1] produces a differentiated good yt(i) according to the production function
yt(i) = ztnt(i), (4.22)
where nt(i) denotes the quantity of labor services used by firm i. The technology level
zt is common across all operating firms and is assumed to follow an AR(1) process
around its non-stochastic steady state value z¯,
log(zt) = (1− ρz) log(z¯) + ρz log(zt−1) + εz,t, (4.23)
in which εz,t is i.i.d and |ρz| < 1. The representative final goods firm produces the
final consumption good yt, combining yt(i) units of each intermediate good, using the
technology
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
ξ−1
ξ di
) ξ
ξ−1
, (4.24)
where ξ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate goods. Profit
maximization subject to (4.24) yields the demand function for intermediate good i,
yt(i) = yt
(
pt(i)
pt
)−ξ
, (4.25)
where
pt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(i)1−ξdi
) 1
1−ξ
(4.26)
is the price index of the final good.
Each firm in the intermediate goods sector chooses its price level pt(i) to maximize
the expected present value of real profits. Following Rotemberg (1982), each firm faces
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quadratic adjustment costs which are assumed to take the functional form of Ireland
(1997). Thus, real profits of firm i are given by
Πt(i) =
(pt(i)
pt
)1−ξ
− wt
zt
(
pt(i)
pt
)−ξ
− ϕ2
(
pt(i)
p¯ipt−1(i)
− 1
)2 yt, (4.27)
where ϕ > 0 determines the adjustment costs and p¯i is the steady state inflation rate.
Assuming symmetry in equilibrium, the optimality condition becomes
ϕ
(
pit
p¯i
− 1
)
pit
p¯i
= (1− ξ) + ξwt
zt
+ Et
[
β
λl,t+1
λl,t
(
pit+1
p¯i
− 1
)
pit+1
p¯i
yt+1
yt
]
. (4.28)
In case of fully flexible prices, i.e. ϕ = 0, real marginal costs equal (ξ − 1)/ξ, which is
the inverse of the firm’s price markup.
4.3.3 Government
The government collects distortionary labor income taxes and issues new bonds to
finance public spending, to service debt from last period, and to pay out lump-sum
transfers to households. Hence, the government’s budget constraint reads
gt + trt + (1 + rg,t−1)
bt−1
pit
= τtwtnt + bt, (4.29)
where government spending gt is a fixed fraction of aggregate output, and transfers trt
adjust to balance the budget in every period. Following Mertens and Ravn (2011), we
assume an AR(2) process for the tax rate around its non-stochastic steady-state value
τ¯ . The process is given by
log(τt) = (1− ρτ,1 − ρτ,2) log(τ¯) + ρτ,1 log(τt−1) + ρτ,2 log(τt−2)− ετ,t, (4.30)
where ετ,t is i.i.d., and |ρτ,1 + ρτ,2| < 1.
Monetary policy is determined by a Taylor-type rule of the form
rg,t = r¯g
(
pit
pi∗
)φpi
, (4.31)
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where pi∗ = p¯i is the inflation rate target and φpi is the policy response to inflation
deviations from its target.
4.3.4 Aggregation and Market Clearing
Aggregate variables are defined as the weighted average of the respective measures for
each household type. Thus, we get
ct = χcl,t + (1− χ)cb,t, (4.32)
vt = χvl,t + (1− χ)vb,t, (4.33)
xt = χxl,t + (1− χ)xb,t, (4.34)
nt = χnl,t + (1− χ)nb,t. (4.35)
Credit and bond market clearing requires
χdl,t = (1− χ)db,t, (4.36)
bt = χbl,t (4.37)
while the aggregate resource constraint is given by
ct + xt + gt =
[
1− ϕ2
(
pit
p¯i
− 1
)2]
yt. (4.38)
4.3.5 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is given by the sequence of endogenous variables {yt, ct, cl,t,
cb,t, vt, vl,t, vb,t, xt, xl,t, xb,t, Υl,t, Υb,t, nt, nl,t, nb,t, dl,t, db,t, bt, bl,t, pit, trt, gt, λl,t, λb,t, qv,t,
qx,t, µt, wt, rd,t, rg,t}∞t=0 that satisfy the households’ first-order conditions, the firms’ op-
timality conditions, the production function, the government budget constraint, the
monetary policy rule, the stochastic processes, credit and bond market clearing, the
aggregation identities, and the aggregate resource constraint, given the exogenous re-
alizations of {zt, τt}∞t=0.
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To solve the model by a log-linear approximation around its deterministic steady
state, we assume that all inequalities hold with equality in equilibrium.
4.4 Parametrization
To study whether our proposed model can account for the empirical findings, we es-
timate deep model parameters by applying an impulse-response matching approach
as suggested by Cogley and Nason (1995). The set of parameters is partitioned into
two subsets, Θ ≡ [θ1, θ2], where θ2 contains the parameters to be estimated and θ1
contains the parameters that are calibrated prior to estimation. The elements of the
latter subset are fixed because they are either difficult to identify in model estimation
procedures or are chosen to match certain steady-state targets observed in the data.
4.4.1 Calibration
One model period is set to be a quarter. We choose the lenders’ discount factor to be
0.993, implying an annual steady-state interest rate of 3%, and follow Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) by setting the borrowers’ discount factor to 0.97 to induce a significant
degree of impatience. The preference parameters determining disutility of work, γl
and γb, are calibrated so that steady state hours worked equal 33% of individual time
endowment. ϑ equals 0.75 which implies an aggregate steady state durable-to-non-
durable-consumption ratio of 20%, in line with the corresponding number in the US
during our sample period. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods,
ξ, equals 11 implying a steady-state markup of ξ/(ξ − 1) = 1.1. For the debt-to-value
ratio, κ, we again follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and choose 0.85 so that borrow-
ing households can use 85% of their durable stock as collateral. Following Mertens
and Ravn (2011), the depreciation rate of durable goods is set to 0.025 implying a
steady state annual depreciation of 10%. We set the policy parameter in the Taylor
rule, φpi, to 1.5 as in Monacelli (2009). The steady state government-bonds-to-GDP,
government-spending-to-GDP ratios, and the labor income tax rate equal 0.60, 0.18,
and 0.28, respectively, as suggested by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Table 4.3 summa-
120
rizes the calibration of θ1.
Table 4.3: Model Calibration
Parameter Value Description Target
βl 0.993 Discount factor lenders Ann. interest rate 3%
βb 0.97 Discount factor borrowers Small degree of impatience
γl Preference parameter SS hours of lenders to 0.33
γb Preference parameter SS hours of borrowers to 0.33
ξ 11.00 Elasticity of substitution SS markup of 10%
δv 0.025 Depreciation rate durable goods Mertens and Ravn (2011)
κ 0.85 Debt-to-value ratio Andrés, Boscá, and Ferri
(2013)
ϑ 0.75 Preference parameter X¯/(C¯ + X¯) = 0.20
φpi 1.50 Taylor rule parameter Monacelli (2009)
B¯/Y¯ 0.60 Government debt to GDP Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
G¯/Y¯ 0.18 Government spending to GDP Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
τ¯n 0.28 SS tax rate Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
4.4.2 Estimation
We estimate θ2 = [η, σ, ψl, ψb, φv, χ, ρz, ϕ, ρτ,1, ρτ,2], by matching the impulse responses
generated by the model to the empirical responses derived in Section 2. Estimating
these parameters does not have an impact on the set of calibrated parameters in θ1.
We target n¯l = n¯b = 0.33 so that γl and γb are endogenously determined.33 We
follow Cogley and Nason (1995) and Mertens and Ravn (2011), and treat model and
data symmetrically. This implies that we use our model to simulate artificial samples
and estimate impulse responses in exactly the same way as the empirical ones are
obtained.34
In particular, the model-generated impulse responses are constructed according to
the following algorithm.
33The two habit parameters have an impact on the steady-state value of Υ and λ, but not on the
first set of calibrated parameters θ1.
34Using this approach avoids certain pitfalls of matching the theoretical impulse responses to the
empirical ones, applied by e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or Altig et al. (2011) as
argued by Kehoe (2006) and Dupor and Liu (2003).
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Algorithm 4.1 (Construction of model-generated IRFs) For each of the two shocks,
we take three steps:
1. Draw 100 sequences of innovations from the original shock series (with replace-
ment) with a length of 168 periods for the tax shock and 195 for the TFP shock.
Simulate the model for each draw so that there are 100 artificial samples. Each
of these simulated datasets consists of the model counterparts to the SVAR time
series.
2. Add a small (1e-6) white noise measurement error to each artificial time series
to avoid stochastic singularity.
3. Estimate IRFs and take mean responses over all 100 replications for each artificial
dataset by estimating (4.1).
Let Ω̂d be the vector of empirical moments and let Ω̂m(θ2|θ1) be the vector of simu-
lated moments estimated from the same SVAR as their empirical counterparts condi-
tioned on θ1. Vector θ2 then solves the following minimization problem,
θ̂2 = arg min
θ2
[(
Ω̂d − Ω̂m(θ2|θ1)
)′
W−1
(
Ω̂d − Ω̂m(θ2|θ1)
)]
, (4.39)
where W is a positive-definite weighting matrix which we find by the following proce-
dure. First, we approximate the covariance matrix of the empirical IRFs by bootstrap-
ping. Instead of the full matrix, we only use its diagonal which displays the variances
of the IRFs and set all off-diagonal elements to zero. Hence, we only put weight on
moments that are observed in the data and force the estimation to exclude moments
that are off-diagonal (see Cochrane, 2005, chap. 11). Finally, we use an estimate of
the weighting matrix’s asymptotic covariance matrix as proposed by Hall et al. (2012)
to compute standard errors for θ2.
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Table 4.4: Estimated Model Parameters
Parameter Estimated Value Standard Error Description
σ 0.6664 0.1657 Utility curvature
η 0.2269 0.1127 Inverse Frisch elasticity
ψl 0.5672 0.3281 Habit parameter lenders
ψb 0.8394 0.0297 Habit parameter borrowers
φv 0.0921 0.0178 Durables adjustment cost
χ 0.5398 0.0425 Share of lending households
ρτ,1 1.8611 0.0447 AR coefficient tax shock
ρτ,2 −0.8745 0.0441 AR coefficient tax shock
ρz 0.9415 0.0165 AR coefficient tfp shock
ϕ 8.1276 0.7065 Rotemberg price adjustment
Notes: Standard errors are computed from an estimate of its asymptotic covariance matrix fol-
lowing Hall et al. (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2011).
4.5 Results
Table 4.4 shows the parameter estimates of our model estimation. For the inverse Frisch
elasticities, η, we estimate a value of 0.227. This value is somewhat lower than those
typically assumed in the macroeconomic literature, whereas Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
obtain a similar point estimate for a comparable model set-up. Our point estimate
implies that labor supply of both agents reacts quite elastically to changes in the real
wage rate. The degree of habit formation is larger for borrowing households than for
lending ones, where the specific point estimates are in the range of values typically
estimated in other studies (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005).
The estimate of the durable adjustment cost parameter of 0.092 is lower compared
to other studies (e.g. Mertens and Ravn, 2011). The estimated Rotemberg price ad-
justment coefficient, ϕ, takes a value of 8.128. The share of lending households in
the economy is estimated to be 54%, consistent with estimates of the proportion of
unconstrained consumers by Jappelli (1990), Kiley (2010).
Our estimates for the autoregressive shock parameters are 0.942 for the TFP shock,
and 1.861,−0.875, for the tax shock. The degree of persistence of the tax process is
similar to the one obtained by Mertens and Ravn (2011).
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Figure 4.2 depicts the model dynamics to a one percent increase in total factor
productivity (left panel) and to a one percentage point decrease in total tax revenues
over output (right column) given the parameter estimates reported in Table 4.4 (dotted
lines) along with the empirical estimates and its confidence bands from section 4.2.2.
As visible, the model can successfully account for the sizes and hump-shaped re-
sponses of the empirical counterparts. For almost all periods, the theoretical responses
lie within the empirical confidence intervals. In line with the data, the strongest model
responses can be observed for durable purchases and household debt, whereas non-
durable consumption shows the smallest relative deviations following both innovations.
In panel (a) we observe that the model produces impact responses close to the empir-
ical ones for the TFP innovation. The technology improvement leads to an expansion
in the theoretical economy lasting for more than 20 quarters. The model’s output,
non-durable, and durable consumption responses reach its peaks slightly before the em-
pirical counterparts. As durable consumption rises, the collateral constraint becomes
less binding, such that borrowing households increase their private debt holdings. The
model is able to capture the persistent increase in household debt as found in the data
while the response lies within the 84% confidence bands for all periods. However, the
model to some extent overestimates the debt response.
In line with our empirical findings, the model does not show any impact response for
most of the variables after a tax reduction as can be observed in panel (b). The limited
model responses can be explained by the estimated strong habits in consumption and
positive durable adjustment cost which reduce the impact effects. For non-durable
consumption, the model implied response reaches its peak after around seven periods,
similar to the maximum empirical response. The specific maximum of the theoretical
responses for output and durable consumption peak some quarters later than found for
the empirical counterparts. The model underestimates the effect of tax cuts on durable
purchases. Similar to the TFP shock, the model matches the households’ empirical debt
response quite well. The theoretical response falls within the empirical 68% confidence
bands for most of the 20 periods. The increase in private borrowing following a tax
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Figure 4.2: Empirical and matched Impulse Responses
(a) TFP shock (b) Tax shock
Notes: This figure depicts VAR estimated impulse responses with actual data (solid line) along with
68% bootstrapped confidence bands (dark grey) and 84% confidence bands (light grey). The dotted
lines denote matched impulse responses using our model.
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reduction can be explained by the similar mechanism as described before for the TFP
shock. The expansionary effects of the tax innovation lead to an increase in the stock of
durables held by constrained agents such that, though the collateral constraint, private
borrowing rises in response.
Our analysis suggests, that an estimated version of the model as described in section
4.3 is able to explain the empirical dynamics following technology improvements and
tax reductions. When studying in more detail how private borrowing reacts, we find
that the differences between theoretical and empirical responses are almost negligible.
4.6 Conclusion
The interrelation between financial market imperfections and macroeconomic outcomes
is at the core of recent research. In this paper, we have studied the effects of TFP shocks
and tax cuts on main aggregates for the US economy while taking a closer look at how
households’ borrowing decisions are affected by both innovations. We have selected
these specific shocks because of their importance for business cycle fluctuations and as
an important instrument for the fiscal authority to stimulate the economy.
By estimating SVARs, we find that both shocks lead to an expansion in the economy,
characterized by significant increases in output, non-durable consumption, and durable
consumption. Moreover, our results suggest that household debt rises substantially and
in a hump-shaped manner in response to technology improvements and tax reductions.
In order to account for the empirically estimated comovement between economic
activity and private borrowing, we have proposed a theoretically model with financial
frictions similar to the one in Monacelli (2009). The model economy is populated by
two household types, savers and borrowers, which differ in their willingness to postpone
consumption into the future. Borrowers face a collateral constraint so that the amount
of newly issued private debt is restricted to a fraction of their stock of durables.
We have estimated deep model parameters by matching the theoretically implied im-
pulse response function to the empirical ones in response to both shocks. Our findings
suggest that the proposed model successfully accounts for the sizes and hump-shaped
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patterns of the empirical dynamics. With respect to our major variable of interest,
household debt, the estimated model matches the empirical responses quite well. Es-
timated parameters are in line with findings in previous studies. Our estimates imply
that almost 50% of private households do face a collateral constraint that restricts their
optimal borrowing decision.
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4.A Appendix
The data are obtained from FRED database and include the following data series.
Table A4.1: Full Data Sources
Variable Definition Code Description
y Output GDP Gross Domestic Product, Seasonally Adjusted
cn Non durable
consumption
PCND Personal Consumption Expenditures: nondurable goods,
seasonally adjusted
PCESV Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services, Seasonally
Adjusted
cd Durable pur-
chases
PCDG Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods, Sea-
sonally Adjusted
h Hours
worked
h Product of hours per worker and civilian non-farm employ-
ment divided by
d total private
debt
CMDEBT Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Credit Market
Instruments; Liability, Level, seasonally adjusted
N Population POP Civilian Non institutional Population, Thousands of Per-
sons
Price Deflators
GDP defla-
tor
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator
Non
durables
deflator
DNDGRG3
Q086SBEA
Personal consumption expenditures: Nondurable goods
DSERRG3
Q086SBEA
Personal consumption expenditures: Services
Durables de-
flator
DDURRG3
Q086SBEA
Personal consumption expenditures: Durable goods
CPI deflator CPIAUCSL Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items
Notes: This table gives FRED codes for the variables used in our estimation.
In addition to the FRED data series, we include the Romer and Romer (2010) tax
series as τ , available at eml.berkeley.edu/ dromer/.
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III Concluding Remarks
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Concluding Remarks
This thesis has presented four essays that study the determinants of private house-
hold debt and the relation between private indebtedness and macroeconomic activity.
Chapter 1 has shown that inequality and household debt are cointegrated of order one
and therefore share a common trending relation. In Chapter 2, I have demonstrated
that interpersonal comparison is an important driver of short-run credit movements.
Chapter 3 has pointed out that the effects of fiscal consolidations crucially depend on
the level of private indebtedness. In Chapter 4, I have presented a model with financial
frictions that is able to replicate the empirical responses of household debt and other
main macro aggregates to TFP shocks and income tax cuts.
Although my thesis contributes to the still growing literature on private household
debt, there remain important questions which deserve further research. First, based
on the findings of Chapter 3, it seems worth studying whether also the impact of fiscal
expansions is significantly influenced by the level of private debt overhang. In future
work, I want to elaborate on this topic and will try to contribute to the literature
on state-dependent government spending multipliers (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2012, 2013; Ramey and Zubairy, 2014). Second, the literature on the interrelation
between monetary policy and household debt is still scanty. How monetary policy
interventions affect households’ debt positions and whether the effects of conventional
or unconventional monetary policy are amplified by the level of private debt could be
interesting questions for future research. Third, as shown by Mian and Sufi (2011, 2012)
high private leverage ratios in the US are responsible for the long-lasting and persistent
decrease in economic activity following the latest financial crisis. As a possible next
research project, I would like to test whether private debt overhang also causes the
slow recovery in the Euro Area.
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